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C O N S T I T U T I O N A L I Z I N G  F E T A L  R I G H T S :
A  S A L U T A R Y  T A L E  F R O M  I R E L A N D
iona de  ondras
In 1983, Ireland became the first country in the world to con-
stitutionalize fetal rights. The 8th Amendment to the Constitution,
passed by a referendum of the People, resulted in constitutional pro-
tection for “the right to life of the unborn,” which was deemed
“equal” to the right to life of the “mother.” Since then, enshrining
fetal rights in constitutions and in legislation has emerged as a key
part of anti-abortion campaigning. This Article traces the constitu-
tionalization of fetal rights in Ireland and its implications for law,
politics, and women. In so doing, it provides a salutary tale of such
an approach. More than thirty years after the 8th Amendment, it
has become clear that Ireland now has an abortion law regime that
is essentially “unliveable.” Not only that, but it has a body of juris-
prudence so deeply determined by a constitutionalized fetal-rights
orientation that law, politics, and medical practice are deeply im-
pacted and strikingly constrained. This is notwithstanding the clear
hardship women in Ireland experience as a result of constitutional-
ized fetal rights and the resultant almost-total prohibition on acces-
sing abortion in Ireland. This Article argues that, wherever one
stands on the question of whether legal abortion ought to be broadly
available in a particular jurisdiction, constitutionalizing fetal rights
leaves no meaningful space for judgment at either political or per-
sonal levels. Furthermore, constitutionalizing fetal rights can have
unforeseen implications across jurisprudence and medical practice,
creating a situation in which there is essentially no space for more
liberal interpretations that respect women’s reproductive autonomy.
While this may be desirable from an ideological perspective for those
who hold a firm anti-abortion position, it is distinctively problem-
atic for women and for politics.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1983, Ireland became the first country in the world to constitution-
alize “fetal rights.”1 The 8th Amendment to the Irish Constitution, passed
by a referendum of the People, resulted in constitutional protection for “the
right to life of the unborn,” which was deemed “equal” to the right to life of
the “mother.”2 Since then, enshrining fetal rights has emerged as a key part
of anti-abortion campaigning across the globe. In this respect, attempts to
create fetal personhood laws in parts of the United States and the attempt to
constitutionalize fetal rights in Wisconsin in 2013 are notable examples.
1. Notably, the 1978 American Convention on Human Rights provides in Art. 4.1 that
“[e]very person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected
by law and, in general, from the moment of conception.” American Convention of
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673, 676. However, in 1983, Ireland was
the first country to provide constitutional protection to the right to life of the fetus.
2. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40.3.3.
2015] C O N S T I T U T I O N A L I Z I N G  F E T A L  R I G H T S 245
The constitutions of Hungary,3 the Dominican Republic,4 Ecuador,5 El Sal-
vador,6 Guatemala,7 Madagascar,8 Paraguay,9 and the Philippines10 now in-
clude fetal rights. The new Kenyan Constitution declares, “The life of a
person begins at conception,”11 although abortion is not fully prohibited in
that jurisdiction.12 The constitutions of Somalia and Swaziland make ex-
press reference to abortion, permitting it only in limited circumstances.13 All
3. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY [Constitution] Apr. 25, 2011, Freedom and
Responsibility, art. II (“the life of the foetus shall be protected from the moment of
conception”).
4. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICA Jan. 26, 2010, title II, ch. I, § I, art.
37 (Dom. Rep.), translated in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED (Jefri Jay
Ruchti ed., Luis Francisco Valle Velasco trans., 2011) (“The right to life is inviolable
from conception to death.”).
5. ORGANO DEL GOBIERNO DEL ECUADOR [Constitution] Oct. 20, 2008, title II, ch.
3, § 5, art. 45, translated in CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR (Minis-
terio de Relaciones Ecuador 2008) (“The State shall recognize and guarantee life,
including care and protection from the time of conception”).
6. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE EL SALVADOR 1983, title 1, art. 1 (“[The
State] recognizes as a human person every human being since the moment of con-
ception”), translated in CONSTITUTE PROJECT (Marcia W. Coward et al. trans., Ox-
ford Univ. Press 2015), available at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/
El_Salvador_2003?lang=en.
7. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA [Constitution] June 3,
1985; revised 1993, title II, ch. I, art. 3 (Guat.), translated in CONSTITUTE PROJECT
(Luis Francisco Valle Velasco trans., William S. Hein & Co. 2012), available at
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Guatemala_1993?lang=en (“The
State guarantees and protects the human life from its conception . . .”).
8. CONSTITUTION DE LA IVEME REPUBLIQUE [Constitution] November 17, 2010, title
II, sub-title II, art. 19 (Madag.), translated in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS ILLUS-
TRATED (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed., Maria del Carmen Gress trans., 2010)  (protecting “the
right to the protection of health” for all persons “from their conception . . .”).
9. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DEL PARAGUAY [Constitution] June 22, 1992, pt.
I, title II, ch. I, sec. I, art. 4 (Para.), translated in CONSTITUTE PROJECT (Maria del
Carmen Gress trans., William S. Hein & Co. 2012), available at https://www.consti-
tuteproject.org/constitution/Paraguay_2011?lang=en (“The right to life is inherent
to the human being. Life is protected, in general, after the time of conception”).
10. CONST. (1987), art. II, sec. 12 (Phil.) (“The State . . . shall equally protect the life of
the mother and the life of the unborn from conception”).
11. CONSTITUTION, art. 26, sec. 2 (2010) (Kenya).
12. Id. at art. 26, sec. 4 provides: “[a]bortion is not permitted unless, in the opinion of a
trained health professional, there is need for emergency treatment, or the life or
health of the mother is in danger, or if permitted by any other written law.”
13. DASTUURKA JAMHUURLYADDA FEDERAALKA SOOMAALIYA [Constitution] June 12,
2012, art. 15, sec. 5 (Som.) (“Abortion is contrary to Shari’ah and is prohibited
except in cases of necessity, especially to save the life of the mother.”); CONSTITU-
TION OF THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND July 26, 2005, sec. 15(5) (“Abortion is
unlawful but may be allowed on medical and therapeutic grounds . . . where the
pregnancy resulted from rape, incest or unlawful sexual intercourse with a mentally
retarded female . . .” or where otherwise provided for by law).
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of this is notwithstanding the fact that, in many jurisdictions, fetuses are not
considered to have any legal personhood until they are born.14
This Article traces the constitutionalization of fetal rights in Ireland
and its implications for law, politics, and women. In so doing, it provides a
salutary tale of such an approach. More than thirty years after the passage of
the 8th Amendment, it is clear that Ireland now has an abortion law regime
that is essentially “unliveable:” unbearable, unsustainable, and unsuited to
the realities of women’s lives. Not only that, but it has a body of jurispru-
dence so deeply determined by constitutionalized fetal rights that law, polit-
ics, and medical practice are deeply impacted and strikingly constrained.15
Without constitutional change, reform to liberalize abortion law is virtually
impossible; politicians struggle to propose imaginative approaches to law
reform that might be permitted under the current constitutional law. Even
if this were not the case, the constitutional position is so restrictive that
meaningful law reform is likely impossible. Furthermore, the constitutional
status quo means that doctors are constrained in their capacity to do what is
considered medically optimal for their patients and instead confine them-
selves to what they consider to be constitutionally permissible. All of this is
notwithstanding the clear hardship women in Ireland experience as a result
of constitutionalized fetal rights and the resultant almost-total prohibition
on accessing abortion.
This Article argues that constitutionalizing fetal rights in Ireland has
left no meaningful space for personal or political judgment about the appro-
priate ways to make abortion available to women and that, regardless of
where one stands on the availability of legal abortion, this is an undesirable
outcome. In a system of constitutionalized fetal rights, it is practically im-
14. See, e.g., Paton v. British Pregnancy Advisory Serv. Trs., [1979] Q.B. 276 (Ir.) (hold-
ing that a husband has no enforceable right to prevent his wife from getting an
abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157-62 (1973) (holding, in part, that laws
banning abortion during the first trimester are unconstitutional); Christian Lawyers’
Assoc. v. Minister for Health 1998 (11) BCLR (CC) at 1434 H (S. Afr.) (holding
that the Constitution of South Africa does not provide any express or implicit pro-
tection for fetal life); Tremblay v. Daigle, [1989] S.C.R. 530 (Can.) (holding that a
fetus has no legal recognition as a “person” in Canadian law).
15. American scholarship has long foreseen such developments in the passage of various
legal provisions throughout the U.S. with “fetal rights” underpinnings (e.g., wrong-
ful death statutes applicable to fetal death). See, e.g., Dawn Johnsen, The Creation of
Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women’s Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy and Equal
Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986) (arguing that expanding “fetal rights” has far-
reaching consequences for women and sets up an adversarial relationship between
the fetus and the woman who bears it); Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Inter-
ventions: What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 9 (1987) (arguing
that “fetal rights” results in the loss or restriction of a range of constitutional rights
for women).
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possible to make successful arguments for a more liberal abortion law. En-
shrining a fetal right to life in the Constitution creates a correlative
responsibility on the part of the State to protect and vindicate that right; a
responsibility that can only be fulfilled through the instrumentalization of
the pregnant woman’s body. When constitutional rights are restrictively in-
terpreted, as is the case in Ireland, women’s constitutional rights are often
subordinated in favor of the sole right of the unborn to life or, more accu-
rately, the right to be born.16 Rather than working to empower pregnant
women to make informed reproductive decisions, the State (through gov-
ernment, courts, and a nationalized health service) has marshaled its respon-
sive capacities to protect the fetus’s bare right to be born without
appropriate regard to its responsibility towards women as constitutional
rights bearers and equal citizens.17 While this may be desirable from an
ideological perspective for those who hold a firm anti-abortion position, it is
distinctly problematic for women and for politics.
This Article first outlines the current law on abortion in Ireland and
then traces the constitutionalization of fetal rights by reference to the vari-
ous constitutional referenda that have been held on the issue. The implica-
tions of that constitutionalization are then considered in respect of the
development through litigation of a corpus of fetal rights jurisprudence, the
resultant fetocentricity of maternal care in Ireland, and the everyday hard-
ship women in Ireland face due to the status quo. Finally, the Article argues
that the current momentum for constitutional change in Ireland should lead
to the proposal of an Amendment to the People that would effectively
deconstitutionalize fetal rights, positively recognize women’s autonomy, and
create the space for political judgment to determine the availability of abor-
tion in Ireland.
II. ABORTION IN IRELAND: THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME
Irish law provides for extremely limited access to abortion. Under Irish
law, abortion is legally available only where it is required to save the life of a
pregnant woman and, even then, only if the fetus is deemed not yet “via-
ble.”18 Where viability of the fetus is established as a matter of medical
16. See Baby O. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, [2002] IESC 44 (Ir.).
17. On the nature and form of an appropriately responsive state, see generally Martha
Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condi-
tion, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008-09) and Martha Albertson Fineman, The
Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State 60 EMORY L.J. 251 (2010).
18. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40.3.3; Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 (Act
No. 35/2013) (Ir.); DEP’T OF HEALTH, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROTECTION OF
LIFE DURING PREGNANCY ACT 2013: GUIDANCE DOCUMENT FOR HEALTH PRO-
FESSIONALS (2014), available at http://health.gov.ie/blog/publications/implementa-
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judgment, pregnancies can be terminated by an intervention such as early
delivery, but not by abortion.19 The current law takes the form of Article
40.3.3 of the Constitution (the 8th Amendment) and the Protection of Life
During Pregnancy Act 2013. Article 40.3.3 provides the constitutional
framework for the law regulating abortion in Ireland:
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with
due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in
its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend
and vindicate that right.
This provision permits abortion only in very limited circumstances. Accord-
ing to the case Attorney General v. X, an abortion is permissible where there
is a “real and substantial risk to the life” of the pregnant woman, and that
risk can only be averted by termination of the pregnancy by means of abor-
tion.20 Whether that is an absolute statement of the limitations of abortion
under the Constitution remains a matter of contention. While the Govern-
ment takes a conservative approach to the interpretation of Article 40.3.3,
considering the X Case to absolutely delimit the availability of abortion,
scholars and activists have argued that the State’s obligation to protect fetal
life extends only “as far as practicable,” so that abortion would also be per-
missible where there is a fatal fetal abnormality.21 While debate as to the
permissibility of abortion under such circumstances continues, it is clear
that a woman whose pregnancy emerges from rape or incest cannot access
an abortion under Irish law unless there is also a real and substantial risk to
her life, notwithstanding her right to access abortion under international
human rights law in such circumstances.22
tion-of-the-protection-of-life-during-pregnancy-act-2013-guidance-document-for-
health-professionals/ [hereinafter PROTECTION OF LIFE].
19. Doctors in Ireland are under a statutory obligation to “preserve unborn human life
as far as practicable.” Thus, where a fetus is viable and the life of the pregnant
woman is at real and substantial risk, the pregnancy will be terminated by means of
early delivery rather than abortion.  Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013
(Act No. 35/2013) §§ 7(1)(a)(ii), 8(1)(a)(ii), 9(1)(a)(ii) (Ir.). See also PROTECTION
OF LIFE, supra note 18; Fiona de Londras & Laura Graham, Impossible Floodgates and
Unworkable Analogies in the Irish Abortion Debate, 3 IRISH J. LEGAL STUD. 54, 61-62
(2013) (explaining that in Ireland, the term “termination of pregnancy” is used to
refer to both abortion and early delivery).
20. Att’y Gen. v. X., [1992] I.R. 1 (Ir.), 53-54.
21. See, e.g., Ruth Fletcher’s Submission to the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Health,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRELAND (May 22, 2013), http://humanrights.ie/criminal-jus-
tice/guestpost-ruth-fletchers-submission-to-the-oireachtas-abortion-hearings/.
22. See Christina Zampas & Jaime M. Gher, Abortion as a Human Right—International
and Regional Standards, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249, 249 (2008) (outlining recent
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Although Article 40.3.3 was introduced into the Constitution in
1983, there was no statutory provision regulating access to abortion until
2013. Thus, while statutory law criminalized abortion outside of the limited
constitutional right discussed above,23 access to constitutionally permissible
abortion was left purely to practice and the medical judgment exercised by
doctors, who themselves operated under the “chilling effect” of the criminal
law.24 Following the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in A, B &
C v. Ireland25 and the death of Savita Halappanavar as a result of an infec-
tion during a protracted miscarriage in 2012,26 the Protection of Life Dur-
ing Pregnancy Act 2013 was introduced. This Act put extensive barriers in
place that affected women’s ability to access abortion, apparently motivated
by the belief that the constitutional right to life of the unborn required both
criminalization of abortion and the imposition of a process that would ef-
fectively ensure no woman could “trick” the system into providing her with
a constitutionally impermissible abortion. This reflects the deeply limiting
effect Article 40.3.3 has on legislative choice. Under the 2013 Act abortion
is available in three circumstances only:
1. Two medical practitioners (one of whom must be an obstetri-
cian) have certified that there is a real and substantial risk to
the life of a pregnant woman that emanates from a physical
illness and which can only be averted by termination of the
pregnancy27 and where the fetus is not yet viable. This certifi-
cation must be done in “good faith,” which is understood as
cognizance of the need to preserve fetal life to the extent pos-
sible;28 or
developments in international human rights law vis-a`-vis women’s ability to access
abortion, including a developing right to access abortion in cases of incest, rape and
“foetal impairment”); Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Ireland,
para. 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4 (2014) (recommending that Ireland
“[r]evise its legislation on abortion, including its Constitution, to provide for addi-
tional exceptions in cases of rape, incest, serious risks to the health of the mother, or
fatal foetal abnormality”).
23. Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. (Eng.).
24. A, B & C v. Ireland, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 70 (2011) (“[T]he Court considers it
evident that the criminal provisions of the 1861 Act would constitute a significant
chilling factor for both women and doctors in the medical consultation process,
regardless of whether or not prosecutions have in fact been pursued under that
Act.”).
25. A, B & C v. Ireland, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 70 (2011).
26. See Kitty Holland, Woman Denied a Termination Dies in Hospital, THE IRISH TIMES
(Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/woman-denied-a-termination-
dies-in-hospital-1.551412.
27. Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act (Act. No. 35/2013) § 7 (Ir.).
28. Id.
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2. There is an emergency situation in which a single doctor has
certified that there is a real and substantial risk to the life of
the pregnant woman that emanates from a physical illness
and which can only be averted by termination of the preg-
nancy,29 and the fetus is not yet viable. This certification
must be done in “good faith,” which is understood as cogni-
zance of the need to preserve fetal life to the extent possible;30
or
3. Three doctors (one of whom must be an obstetrician and one
of whom must be a psychiatrist) have certified that there is a
real and substantial risk to the life of the pregnant woman
that emanates from a risk of suicide and which can only be
averted by termination of the pregnancy,31 and the fetus is
not yet viable. This certification must be done in “good
faith,” which is understood as cognizance of the need to pre-
serve fetal life to the extent possible.32
Rather than being expressly outlined in the legislation, the viability
element of these tests is implicit and emanates from the constitutional pro-
vision that states that “the unborn” and “the mother” have an “equal” right
to life.33 Outside of these three strictly regulated circumstances abortion
constitutes the criminal offence of “destruction of unborn human life”
under § 22 of the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013. Section
22 provides:
(1) It shall be an offence to intentionally destroy unborn human
life.
(2) A person who is guilty of an offence under this section shall
be liable on indictment to a fine or imprisonment for a term not
exceeding 14 years, or both.
(3) A prosecution for an offence under this section may be
brought only by or with the consent of the Director of Public
Prosecutions.
29. Id. § 8.
30. Id.
31. Id. § 9.
32. Id.
33. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40.3.3; see Fiona de Londras, Suicide and Abortion: Analysing
the Legislative Options in Ireland, 19 MEDICO-LEGAL J. IR. 4, 5 (2013) (outlining the
implicit viability threshold); de Londras and Graham, supra note 19, at 60-62 (argu-
ing that there is an implicit viability threshold in Irish abortion law); see also PRO-
TECTION OF LIFE, supra note 18, § 1.
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Importantly, under § 22, criminalization extends not only to doctors
but also to women who purchase abortifacients online and take them in the
privacy of their own homes, reportedly a common approach to terminating
unwanted pregnancy in Ireland.34 All of this constitutes one of the strictest
abortion regimes in Europe: considerations such as rape, incest, risk to
health (mental or physical), economic circumstances, even fatal fetal abnor-
malities that will result either in death in utero or a short and painful life for
the child if the pregnancy is brought to term, are quite simply irrelevant.
Abortion is permitted only where the pregnant woman will, almost cer-
tainly, die without it.
The criminal law regime does not end there. While women have a
constitutional right to travel to access an abortion,35 as well as information
on abortion36 (both secured in 199237), a medical professional based in Ire-
land cannot refer a pregnant woman to an overseas clinic or make an ap-
pointment for her in such a clinic. To do so is a criminal offence under the
Regulation of Information (Availability of Services Outside the State for
Termination of Pregnancies) Act 1995. Section 8(1) of that Act provides
that “it shall not be lawful” for a medic or counselor (or their employees or
agents) to “make an appointment or any other arrangement for or on behalf
of a woman with a person who provides services outside the state for the
termination of pregnancies.”38
Simply put, the logical extrapolation from the legal status quo is that
only a woman who is dying and incapable of traveling has an abortion in
Ireland. For everyone else, purchasing and using abortifacients illegally,
travelling to another state in order to access an abortion, or simply resigning
oneself to the pregnancy are the only options. Although there is no formal
border between Northern Ireland (which is part of the United Kingdom)
and the Republic of Ireland, the Abortion Act 1967 (the Westminster law)
does not apply in Northern Ireland.39 Thus, apart from in exceptional situa-
34. See Carol Ryan, Abortion by Post, THE IRISH TIMES, March 15, 2011, http://www
.irishtimes.com/news/health/abortion-by-post-1.573017.
35. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40.3.3 (“This subsection shall not limit freedom to travel
between the State and another state”).
36. Id. (“This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the
State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information relating to
services lawfully available in another state.”).
37. Id. These provisions were inserted into to the Constitution by the 13th and 14th
Amendments to the Constitution in December 1992. The 1992 referendum is dis-
cussed further below.
38. Regulation of Information (Availability of Services Outside the State for Termination
of Pregnancies) Act (Act. No. 5/1995) § 8(1) (Ir.).
39. The Abortion Act 1967 was never adopted in Northern Ireland. Thus, abortion
remains a criminal offence in that jurisdiction as per the Offences Against the Person
Act 1861 and the Criminal Justice Act, 1945, 9 Geo. 6, § 25 (N. Ir). Following the
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tions, abortion cannot usually be legally accessed anywhere on the island of
Ireland.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FETAL RIGHTS IN IRELAND
The current law on abortion in Ireland, outlined above, is clearly
framed by Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution. However, that provision is of
a relatively recent provenance. When Ireland became a Free State in 1922
and introduced Bunreacht na hE´ireann (the Constitution of Ireland) in
1937, abortion had been prohibited in Ireland, as in other parts of the
United Kingdom, since the promulgation of the Offences Against the Per-
son Act 1861, § 58. This law made it a serious offence—punishable by life
imprisonment—to procure a miscarriage:
Every Woman, being with Child, who, with Intent to procure
her own Miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to herself any
Poison or other noxious Thing, or shall unlawfully use any In-
strument or other Means whatsoever with the like Intent, and
whosoever, with Intent to procure the Miscarriage of any
Woman, whether she be or be not with Child, shall unlawfully
administer to her or cause to be taken by her any Poison or other
noxious Thing, or shall unlawfully use any Instrument or other
Means whatsoever with the like Intent, shall be guilty of Felony,
and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the Discretion of
the Court, to be kept in Penal Servitude for Life or for any Term
not less than Three Years,—or to be imprisoned for any Term
not exceeding Two Years, with or without Hard Labour, and
with or without Solitary Confinement.40
Although 1937 marked the introduction of a new constitutional order
in Ireland, this did not sever all links with the pre-existing laws or repeal the
statute book in toto.41 Rather, laws that were not expressly repealed were
decision of R. v. Bourne [1939] 1 K.B. 687, 694 (N. Ir.), abortion is permitted in
Northern Ireland where a “doctor is of the opinion, on reasonable grounds and with
adequate knowledge, that the probable consequence of the continuance of the preg-
nancy will be to make the woman a physical or mental wreck,” which has been
interpreted as permitting abortion where there is a risk that continuing the preg-
nancy would have a real and serious detrimental impact on the pregnant woman’s
health, or where it is required to save the life of the pregnant woman. This position
was reaffirmed in In re. Application by the Soc’y for the Protection of Unborn Children
for Judicial Review [2009] N.I.Q.B. 92.
40. Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., § 58 (Eng.).
41. Between the establishment of the Irish Free State and the introduction of the 1937
Constitution, a transitional constitution operated: the Constitution of the Irish Free
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automatically carried over, although they were susceptible to being chal-
lenged for incompatibility with the Irish Constitution and, if found to be
incompatible, struck down.42 Thus, from the emergence of the modern
Irish State in 1937 until the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013,
abortion was criminally prohibited in Ireland under the Offences Against
the Person Act 1861.
The anchoring of the prohibition of abortion in a colonial-era law
ought not to be taken to suggest that the criminalization of abortion was or
is a colonial yoke from which the Irish polity has struggled to escape. The
prohibition of abortion was happily carried into Irish law in 1937 and, in-
deed, not permitting abortion was closely bound up in the self-identifying
Catholicism of the Irish State at the time.43 The strength of that Catholi-
State. It did not include any reference to abortion, but did carry the pre-existing
statute book over into the post-partition legal order. On the Free State constitutional
order, see, e.g., LEO KOHN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE IRISH FREE STATE (1932).
On women’s citizenship under the 1922 Constitution, see generally Caitrı´ona Beau-
mont, Women, Citizenship and Catholicism in the Irish Free State, 1922-1948, 6
WOMEN’S HIST. REV. 563 (1997).
42. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 50.
43. Although Ireland is a constitutionally secular state, the Preamble to the Constitution
(which has not been amended) indicates the religiosity of the state as founded. It
provides:
“In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to
Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be
referred,
We, the people of E´ire,
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus
Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial,
Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain the
rightful independence of our Nation,
And seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of Pru-
dence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individ-
ual may be assured, true social order attained, the unity of our country
restored, and concord established with other nations,
Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution.”
IR. CONST., 1937, pmbl. In addition, the Constitution as originally introduced in-
cluded the following provision as Article 44.1.2: “The State recognizes the special
position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the
Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens.” In Article 44.1.3 “[t]he State
also recognize[d] the Church of Ireland, the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, the
Methodist Church in Ireland, the Religious Society of Friends in Ireland, as well as
the Jewish Congregations and the other religious denominations existing in Ireland
at the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution.” Article 44 was re-
moved in its entirety by the 5th Amendment to the Constitution, approved by refer-
endum in December 1972. On religion and the Irish Constitution, see generally
EOIN DALY, RELIGION, LAW AND THE IRISH STATE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAME-
WORK IN CONTEXT (2012).
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cism stood in sharp contradistinction to the Protestantism of “England,”
especially in a proximate post-colonial context in which to be Irish was, to a
significant extent, to be “not English.”44 As considered further in Part VII of
this Article, the narrative of abortion as an “un-Irish” phenomenon has con-
tinued since then.
Although there are reports that women based in Ireland did access
abortion within the jurisdiction,45 as a general matter there was no strong
organized movement to legalize abortion in the early days of the state. Until
the mid- to late-1970s, women in Ireland had little autonomy. This is re-
flected in the fact that contraception was effectively unavailable, its importa-
tion was a criminal offence,46 and women who got pregnant outside of
marriage frequently found themselves detained in institutions, usually run
by the Catholic Church, such as Magdalen Laundaries and “Mother and
Baby Homes.”47 Women’s autonomy was further restricted in economic and
employment terms: there was no equal pay or other employment equality
legislation, married women were required to leave state-funded employ-
ment,48 and the Minister for Industry and Commerce had the power to
limit the number of women employed in any industry.49 In the area of
44. See Siobha´n Mullally, Debating Reproductive Rights in Ireland 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 78,
at 82-83 (2005); see generally Ruth Fletcher, Post-Colonial Fragments: Representations
of Abortion in Irish Law and Politics, 28 J.L. & SOC’Y 568 (2001) (arguing that a
distinctively “pro-life” identity has been constructed as part of the post-colonial pro-
ject of developing a distinctive Irishness).
45. See, e.g., Anne O’Connor, Abortion: Myths and Realities from the Irish Folk Tradition,
in THE ABORTION PAPERS IRELAND 57 (Ailbhe Smyth ed., 1992).
46. This was criminalized under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1935, which was
struck down by the Supreme Court in McGee v. Att’y Gen., [1974] I.R. 284. The
availability of contraception was then regulated by the Health (Family Planning) Act
1979, (Act No. 20/1979), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1979/en/act/
pub/0020/ (discussed below).
47. On the confinement of “deviant” women in Ireland, see, e.g., Una Crowley and Rob
Kitchin, Producing ‘Decent Girls’: Governmentality and the Moral Geographies of Sex-
ual Conduct in Ireland (1922-1937) 15 GENDER, PLACE & CULTURE 355, 368-69
(2008); Brian Titley, Magdalen Asylums and Moral Regulation in Ireland, in SCHOOLS
AS DANGEROUS PLACES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 119 (Anthony Potts & Tom
O’Donoghue eds., 2007); see generally James M. Smith, The Politics of Sexual Knowl-
edge: The Origins of Ireland’s Containment Culture and the Carrigan Report (1931), 13
J. HIST. OF SEXUALITY 208 (2004).
48. The “marriage bar,” as it was called, only impacted a small number of women, but
was part of a broader pattern of economic disenfranchisement of women. On this,
see generally Caitrı´ona Beaumont, Gender, Citizenship and the State in Ireland, 1922-
1990, in IRELAND IN PROXIMITY: HISTORY, GENDER AND SPACE 94 (David Alder-
son et al. eds., 1999).
49. Conditions of Employment Act 1935, § 16, (Act No. 2/1936), available at http://
www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1936/act/2/enacted/en/html.
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family law, divorce was unavailable,50 there was practically no provision
available for women in the event of marital breakdown,51 and the Constitu-
tion reinforced highly gendered expectations of women as caregivers and
mothers.52 In other words, Ireland was a deeply conservative country in
which Catholicism held a steady grip. Furthermore, politics and the legal
and medical professions were dominated by conservative men who were
often heavily influenced by senior members of the Catholic Church.53 In
this context, political movements for women’s empowerment and effective
participation struggled to achieve traction in the public square.54 Bearing all
of this in mind, it hardly seems to have been necessary to campaign for the
constitutionalization of fetal rights in order to prevent the possibility of
decriminalizing abortion. The introduction of abortion in Ireland simply
seemed like an impossibly remote prospect.
Notwithstanding that, domestic and international developments to-
gether resulted in the emergence of just such a movement.
A. The 1983 Referendum and Introduction of the 8th Amendment
In the early 1970s, the US Supreme Court interpreted the right to
privacy as including a right to access abortion in Roe v. Wade;55 a develop-
ment that followed an assertion of the right to access contraception in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut.56 This immediately made anti-abortion campaigners in
Ireland anxious that something similar to Roe might emerge in Ireland. In
Ireland, the constitutional right to privacy had already been developed into
a right to access contraception, which allowed the Supreme Court in McGee
v. Attorney General to strike down the criminalization of importing contra-
50. Divorce was constitutionally prohibited until 1995. It is now permitted, subject to
very strict requirements, by virtue of the Constitution. IR. CONST., 1937, art.
41.3.2; Family Law Act 1995 (Act No. 26/1995), available at http://www.irishsta-
tutebook.ie/1995/en/act/pub/0026/.
51. See YVONNE GALLIGAN, Family Law Reform, in WOMEN AND POLITICS IN CONTEM-
PORARY IRELAND: FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM 90 (1998).
52. See Siobha´n Mullally, Equality Guarantees in Irish Constitutional Law: The Myth of
Constitutionalism and the “Neutral State”, in IRELAND’S EVOLVING CONSTITUTION:
1937-1997 147, 162 (Tim Murphy & Patrick Twomey eds., 1998).
53. See generally DIARMUID FERRITER, OCCASIONS OF SIN: SEX AND SOCIETY IN MOD-
ERN IRELAND (2009) (outlining the impact of the Catholic Church on societal and
sexual relations in Ireland).
54. See generally LINDA CONNOLLY, THE IRISH WOMEN’S MOVEMENT: FROM REVOLU-
TION TO DEVOLUTION (2003) (outlining the continuing, developing and iterative
nature of the Irish women’s movement and arguing that there has been continuous
feminist activity from the late 19th century to the present day but that it received
little political attention up to the 1970s).
55. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
56. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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ception.57 In that case, Walsh J. expressly endorsed the view that the Consti-
tution was a living, dynamic document that had to develop with society.58
Following McGee, the Health (Family Planning) Act 1979 was introduced
to allow doctors who did not hold a relevant conscientious objection to
prescribe contraceptives for “bona fide family planning purposes” (generally
interpreted as meaning “to married couples”).59 The legalization of contra-
ception in Ireland, together with McGee and the US Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Roe, caused anxiety among anti-abortion campaigners.60
At this time—in the early 1980s—Irish politics was enormously vola-
tile. There had been numerous, fragile governments in a small number of
years and the country was on the brink of economic and political collapse.61
It was in this context that the Pro-Life Amendment Campaign (PLAC) was
founded, which quickly became “the most powerful campaigning group in
recent Irish history.”62 This was the perfect situation in which to extract
political promises. PLAC managed to secure a commitment for a constitu-
tional referendum on abortion63 following two years during which
“[p]rofessional associations, cultural organizations, community associations,
women’s groups and political parties were all forced to state their position
[on abortion], amid an atmosphere of increasing tension and ‘moral black-
57. [1974] I.R. 284 (Ir.).
58. [1974] I.R. 284, 318-19 (Ir.).
59. “A registered medical practitioner may, for the purposes of this Act, give a prescrip-
tion or authorisation for a contraceptive to a person if he is satisfied that the person
is seeking the contraceptive, bona fide, for family planning purposes or for adequate
medical reasons and in appropriate circumstances and, where a prescription or au-
thorization of a registered medical practitioner in relation to a contraceptive bears an
indication that it is given for the purposes of this Act, it shall be conclusively pre-
sumed, for the purposes of this section, that the person named in it is a person who,
in the opinion of the practitioner formed at the time of the giving of the prescription
or authorisation, sought the contraceptive for the purpose, bona fide, of family plan-
ning or for adequate medical reasons and in appropriate circumstances.” Health
(Family Planning) Act 1979 (Act No. 20/1979), § 4(2), available at http://www
.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1979/act/20/enacted/en/print.
60. Ursula Barry, Abortion in the Republic of Ireland, 29 FEMINIST REV. 57, 58 (1988).
61. For a short overview, see THOMAS BARTLETT, IRELAND: A HISTORY 527-33 (2010).
62. Barry, supra note 60, at 58. On the founding and influence of PLAC, see Fintan
O’Toole, Why Ireland Became the Only Country in the World to Have a Constitutional
Ban on Abortion, Aug. 26 2014, THE IRISH TIMES, http://www.irishtimes.com/news/
politics/why-ireland-became-the-only-country-in-the-democratic-world-to-have-a-
constitutional-ban-on-abortion-1.1907610; see also TOM H HESKETH, THE SECOND
PARTITIONING OF IRELAND: THE ABORTION REFERENDUM OF 1983 (1990) (on the
emergence and power of PLAC).
63. Article 46 of the Constitution provides that amendment is only permissible by refer-
endum and no popular initiative is permitted. Rather, a referendum must be initi-
ated by government. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 46.
2015] C O N S T I T U T I O N A L I Z I N G  F E T A L  R I G H T S 257
mail.’ ”64 Not only that, but PLAC and the Catholic Church had clear influ-
ence over the wording that was put to the People; a wording that, as
outlined above, constitutionalized fetal rights in Ireland. In late 1983, the
8th Amendment was put before, and approved by, the People.
The 1983 abortion referendum is widely regarded as one of the most
brutish and bruising in the history of constitutional referenda in Ireland;65
the tone of public debate was intolerant to the extent that an editorial in the
Irish Times described it as “the second partitioning of Ireland.”66 The anti-
abortion campaign was astonishingly well-resourced. Furthermore, at that
time, the Catholic Church remained a fiercely influential, if not dominant,
social and political force, and priests across the country preached for a “Yes”
vote.67
Although voter turnout was low, a huge majority (66.9%)68 of those
who voted supported the Amendment, and thus Article 40.3.3, the 8th
Amendment to the Constitution, was enacted. This Amendment, which
constitutionalized fetal rights, “identified the people of Ireland as protectors
of the foetus;”69 a position that persists, at the level of rhetoric at least, to
this day.
B. The X Case and the 1992 Referendum
Barry Gilhealy argues, “[t]he anti-abortionists were able to score with
such devastating success in the early 1980s because of the residual strength
of tradition in the political culture, despite the rapid social change of the
previous two decades.”70  That residual traditionalism and conservatism
manifested itself in the narrow and highly restrictive interpretation and ap-
plication of the 8th Amendment: courts prohibited travel for abortion and
the provision or receipt of information about abortion, while cultivating a
64. HESKETH, supra note 62, at 58.
65. On constitutional referenda in Ireland, see Fiona de Londras & David Gwynn Mor-
gan, Constitutional Amendment in Ireland, in ENGINEERING CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROPE, CANADA AND THE USA 179
(Xenephon Contiades ed., 2012). On the nature and divisiveness of this referendum,
see generally HESKETH, supra note 63.
66. Editorial, The Second Partitioning of Ireland, Aug. 30, 1983, THE IRISH TIMES at 9.
67. Indeed, at the time, the Roman Catholic Church dominated the provision of health
care and education in Ireland and, together with medics, “had acquired a moral
monopoly of knowledge around sex and ethics.” Barry Gilheany, The State and the
Discursive Construction of Abortion, in GENDER, POLITICS AND THE STATE 58, 72
(Vicky Randall & Georgina Waylen eds., 1998).
68. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, CMTY. AND LOCAL GOV’T REFERENDUM RESULTS 1937-
2015, 38 [hereinafter REFERENDUM RESULTS].
69. Fletcher, supra note 44, at 575.
70. Gilheany, supra note 67, at 72.
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massive social stigma and fear on the part of women who wanted to termi-
nate their pregnancy. As the jurisprudence on the 8th Amendment, dis-
cussed in Part IV, demonstrates, the right to life of the unborn was elevated
to effectively the highest constitutional position; there was no “public lan-
guage with which to conceptualize the relationship between woman and
fetus”71 beyond that of fetal rights. In this way, the 8th Amendment was
remarkably successful in structuring Irish abortion law around a “cultural
and official recognition of foetal rights.”72
Anti-abortion activists, such as PLAC, considered the 8th Amendment
to have made it impossible for abortion to ever be legally provided for in
Ireland; however, developments in the early 1990s challenged that under-
standing. In 1991, a 14-year-old pregnant rape victim, subsequently known
as “X,” and her parents travelled to the UK in order for her to obtain an
abortion. Before they had completed the procedure, they contacted the
Gardaı´ [Irish police force] to ask whether DNA evidence from the aborted
fetus might be useful as evidence in the prosecution of her rapist. As a
result, the Attorney General was informed. The Attorney General instituted
proceedings to secure an injunction to prevent the young girl from getting
an abortion abroad. He explained his decision by reference to his duty, on
behalf of the State, to protect the constitutional rights of the fetus.73 The
victim and her parents returned to Ireland for the hearing, and the High
Court issued the injunction on the basis of the unborn’s constitutional right
to life. The public responded to this decision with massive protests and
general public outcry.74
Although the electorate had approved Article 40.3.3 by referendum,
the baldness of this specific set of facts starkly illustrated just how restrictive
that wording could be. It resulted in an outcome that many had not antici-
pated: the literal confinement of a teenage child who had been raped and
then claimed to want to kill herself, all for the purpose of ensuring the fetus
would be born alive. So fractious was the atmosphere after the High Court
decision that the government reportedly asked the child’s family to appeal
and offered to pay all of the costs.75 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed
71. Id. at 73.
72. Lisa Smyth, Feminism and Abortion Politics: Choice, Rights, and Reproductive Freedom,
25 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L. F. 335, 336-37 (2002).
73. See Scannal - X-Case, RTE´ TELEVISION, http://www.rte.ie/tv/scannal/xcase.html (last
visited Oct. 6, 2015) (“The problem was stark. There was an unborn child with a
constitutional right to life. There was nobody to advocate the right of that child to
be born other than the Attorney General”).
74. See Ailbhe Smyth, A Sadistic Farce: Women and Abortion in the Republic of Ireland,
1992, in THE ABORTION PAPERS IRELAND, supra note 45, at 7, 12.
75. Id.
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the decision of the High Court.76 In this decision, which is seen as defining
the contours of abortion law in Ireland, the Court held that abortion was
permissible under Article 40.3.3 where “it is established as a matter of
probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct from
the health, of the mother, which can only be avoided by the termination of
her pregnancy . . . .”77 That risk could be a risk of suicide, as well as a risk
emanating from physical illness.78 X was thus permitted to travel in order to
obtain an abortion.
The anti-abortion lobby was deeply displeased with the Court’s inter-
pretation of Article 40.3.3. They argued that this reading of the 8th
Amendment was not congruent with what had been intended when the
referendum was passed. Where a woman’s life was at risk from a physical
illness, treatment that would result in the death of a fetus could be adminis-
tered—although that was not generally categorized as abortion—and was
said to be within the contemplation of Article 40.3.3 from its inception.
However, a risk of suicide, as was present in the X Case, was seen as qualita-
tively different. Some argued that suicide was a risk that could be prevented
(or avoided) without terminating the pregnancy. In other words, they ar-
gued that an abortion undertaken where the risk to the pregnant woman’s
life was a risk of suicide constituted the deliberate destruction of the fetus,
rather than being a “side effect” of treatment as in the case of physical ill-
ness. William Binchy, a prominent member of the anti-abortion lobby and
then the Regius Professor-elect of Laws at Trinity College Dublin, wrote an
article in the Irish Times shortly after the Supreme Court decision in which
he stated,
The Supreme Court . . . has introduced an abortion regime of
wide-ranging dimensions, beyond any effective control or practi-
cal limitation . . . In practice, no prosecution of an abortionist
will have any real prospect of success if the woman seeking an
abortion has threatened suicide.79
Shortly thereafter, a campaign to have the Constitution amended took
shape.
The original post-X proposal emanating from anti-abortion campaign-
ers was that Article 40.3.3 should be amended to expressly prohibit “inten-
tional abortion,” which Binchy said would bring the Constitution “in line
76. Att’y Gen. v. X., [1992] I.R. 1 (Ir.).
77. X Case, 53-54 [1992] I.R. 1 (Ir.).
78. X Case, [1992] I.R. 1 (Ir.).
79. William Binchy, New Abortion Regime Has No Effective Limits, THE IRISH TIMES,
Mar. 6, 1992, at 13.
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with the intentions of those who voted for the [8th] Amendment in
1983.”80 Under this proposal, a risk of suicide by the woman could not be a
basis for constitutionally permissible abortion. Instead of an abortion, Dr.
Catherine Bannon claimed that a pregnant woman who expresses suicidal
intentions can be admitted to the hospital, voluntarily or involuntarily,
“where she can be watched, receive psychiatric therapy and [be] safeguarded
against herself.”81
Unlike in the early 1980s, however, the political parties took control
of the situation; wording for three referenda was drafted without consulta-
tion with the Catholic Church and with cross-party agreement to reject any
wording proposed by the anti-abortion lobby.82 Three constitutional
changes were proposed to the People: (1) ensure abortion was not available
on the basis of suicidal ideation/risk on the part of the pregnant woman, (2)
provide for a right to travel, and (3) provide for a right to information. The
travel and information rights were approved in the referendum, adding two
further clauses to Article 40.3.3, but the proposed 12th Amendment was
unsuccessful. That Amendment would have removed the 1983 text and re-
placed it with the following:
It shall be unlawful to terminate the life of an unborn unless
such termination is necessary to save the life, as distinct from the
health, of the mother where there is an illness or disorder of the
mother giving rise to a real and substantial risk to her life, not
being a risk of self-destruction.
This proposed Amendment was clearly intended to reverse the Su-
preme Court’s decision, but the People rejected it (65.35% against, 34.65%
in favor),83 and the interpretation of the 8th Amendment set forth in the X
Case remained in place.
C. The 2002 Referendum
In 2002, the Government put a complex constitutional Amendment
on abortion to the People. The proposed 25th Amendment to the Constitu-
tion was presented as a package of reforms in the area of so-called “crisis
pregnancy” and had four main parts: (1) to ensure that life was protected
from the moment of implantation (as opposed to conception), (2) to re-
80. Maol Muire Tynan, Campaign to Amend the Constitution Launched, THE IRISH
TIMES, Mar. 11, 1992, at 3.
81. Id.
82. Gilheany, supra note 67, at 74-75.
83. See REFERENDUM RESULTS, supra note 68, at 47.
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quire the Oireachtas [Parliament] to pass the proposed Protection of
Human Life in Pregnancy Act 2002 within 180 days of the referendum, (3)
to grant the proposed Act constitutional protection so that, in the future, it
could only be amended by referendum of the People, and (4) to permit
abortion when it was necessary to prevent loss of the pregnant woman’s life
except when the threat to her life was a risk of suicide (i.e., to undo this
element of the X Case).84
In order to implement this fourth objective, the proposed Protection
of Human Life in Pregnancy Act 2002 defined abortion as “the intentional
destruction by any means of unborn life after implantation in the womb of
a woman.”85 To accommodate the constitutional position, § 1(2) of the
proposed Act went on to provide that abortion did
not include the carrying out of a medical procedure by a medical
practitioner . . . in the course of which or as a result of which
unborn human life is ended where that procedure is, in the rea-
sonable opinion of the practitioner, necessary to prevent a real
and substantial risk of loss of the women’s life other than by self-
destruction.86
Abortion, as thus defined, was to remain criminalized.
The proposed 25th Amendment was extraordinary and divisive. Not
only did this Amendment intend to enshrine a unique piece of primary
legislation in the Constitution, but it also defined constitutional life in
terms of implantation rather than conception and proposed to reverse the
“risk of suicide” exception to criminalized abortion that came from the X
Case.  This proposal was particularly divisive because it did not have the
84. The proposed amendment would have added the following text to Article 40.3.3:
4º In particular the life of the unborn in the womb shall be protected in
accordance with the provisions of the Protection of Human Life in Preg-
nancy Act 2002.
5º The provisions of section 2 of Article 46 and sections 1, 3 and 4 of
Article 47 of this Constitution shall apply to any Bill passed or deemed to
have been passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas containing a proposal to
amend the Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy Act, 2002, as they apply
to a Bill containing a proposal or proposals for the amendment of this Con-
stitution and any such Bill shall be signed by the President forthwith upon
his being satisfied that the Bill has been duly approved by the people in
accordance with the provisions of section 1 of Article 47 of this Constitu-
tion and shall be duly promulgated by the President as a law.
Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy Bill 2001 (referendum failed on Mar. 6,
2002).
85. Id. § 1(1).
86. Id. § 1(2).
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support of all of the main political parties—a situation rather unusual for a
proposed constitutional change in Ireland. In fact, only the Government
parties (then Fianna Fa´il and the Progressive Democrats) supported it, while
all other main parties (Fine Gael, Labour, The Green Party, and Sinn Fe´in)
opposed it.87 Furthermore, both the anti-abortion groups and the country
at large were divided on the issue.88 In a startlingly close referendum vote in
March 2002, 50.4% of those who turned out voted “no,” while 49.6%
voted “yes.”89 Thus, the Constitution remained unchanged, and the text
today is as was introduced in 1983 (8th Amendment) together with the
information and travel Amendments from 1992 (13th and 14th
Amendments).
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW: FETAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE POST-1983
The constitutionalization of fetal rights in Ireland has had significant
implications for women’s rights, not least because of the superior courts’
expansive and deeply conservative interpretation of its provisions and their
reach. That being said, the judicial approach to Article 40.3.3 outlined be-
low was not inevitable. It is clear that on the plain reading of the text of the
8th Amendment there is space for an interpretation that allows greater re-
productive autonomy to women. Such an approach would concentrate on
the phrases “with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother” and “as
far as practicable” to recognize the qualitative difference between the right
to life of the fetus (i.e. the right to be born) and that of the pregnant women
(embedded in a range of other constitutional rights). This approach would
allow an interpretation that is more responsive to the realities of pregnant
women’s lives. Indeed, it might even allow for an expansive and positive
interpretation of Article 40.3.3—one that encourages the State to ensure
that health-care facilities, child-support structures, welfare infrastructure,
education, family law, and economic policies generate circumstances in
which unwanted abortion, borne out of socio-economic necessity, might be
minimized.90
Rather than doing this, however, the Irish courts endorsed an interpre-
tation of the 8th Amendment that reduced a woman from being a rights-
bearing individual to a fetus-bearing mother. Such interpretation was
87. For an outline of parties’ positions in the campaign and the campaign in general, see
Fiachra Kennedy, Report - Abortion Referendum 2002, 17 IRISH POL. STUD. 114
(2002).
88. Id.
89. REFERENDUM RESULTS, supra note 68, at 71.
90. For discussion on these themes, see, e.g., Justin Murray, Introduction, in IN SEARCH
OF COMMON GROUND ON ABORTION: FROM CULTURE WAR TO REPRODUCTIVE
JUSTICE 3, 3-4 (Justin Murray et al. eds., 2014).
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shaped by the form of Article 40.3.3 itself. One of the most striking aspects
of the text of Article 40.3.3 is its omission of the word “woman.” Pregnant
women are instead described as mothers—reclassified from the moment of
conception from “woman” to “mother”—and as a consequence, someone
whose rights to autonomy, bodily integrity, agency, and self-determination
are subordinated to the rights of the fetus she is carrying.91
Lisa Smyth notes that such structuring of rights discourse flows from
framing access to abortion as a matter of a “right to choose” and the prohi-
bition on abortion as a matter of “fetal rights.”92 For Smyth, the claim that
the fetus is a rights-bearer means that it “must be constructed as morally
equivalent to women,”93 which in turn works itself out in three key claims.
First, that the fetus is morally equivalent to a woman per se (i.e. is a rights-
bearer). Second, that the fetus is morally superior to an “involuntarily preg-
nant, and implicitly sexually guilty, woman,” in other words the fetus can
make a rights claim against the woman’s rights claim. Third, that the right
to choose carries less moral weight than the claim of a fetal right to life.94
The jurisprudence interpreting Article 40.3.3 bears out the production of
these key narratives in Ireland and largely emanates from an aggressive liti-
gation strategy by anti-abortion groups. These groups target access to infor-
mation and freedom of travel in order to prevent women in Ireland from
accessing abortion abroad as well as “at home” in Ireland. They base this
strategy on the duty to respect and vindicate the fetal right to life now
contained in Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution. Much, although not all, of
this jurisprudence was developed prior to the X Case, when it was generally
considered that the 8th Amendment absolutely prohibited abortion in every
circumstance.
A. Travel and Information
In the 1980s and early 1990s, before the internet expanded access to
information, women who were contemplating traveling in order to access
abortion were limited to acquiring information through various volunteer
telephone services run by women in the UK, or by consulting with counsel-
ors and doctors at Open Door and Well Woman clinics, primarily located
in Dublin.95 The non-universal availability of telephones and dependence
91. As Ursula Barry puts it, the 8th Amendment constituted “a radical redefinition of
women under the law: Irish women have been recategorised to be equal to that
which is not yet born.” Barry, supra note 60, at 59.
92. See Smyth, supra note 72, at 336-37.
93. Id. at 337.
94. Id.
95. ANN ROSSITER, IRELAND’S HIDDEN DIASPORA: THE ‘ABORTION TRAIL’ AND THE
MAKING OF A LONDON-IRISH UNDERGROUND, 1980-2000 93-103 (2009).
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on operator exchanges in some parts of the country made reliance on tele-
phone helplines difficult,96 and women in rural areas had less access to clin-
ics than those in urban centers. Organizations such as Well Woman and
Open Door would provide one-on-one counseling and advice to women
who were experiencing what was then called “crisis pregnancy.” Their ser-
vices included providing information about the availability of abortions in
the UK, providing names and locations of clinics, and, if necessary, contact-
ing the clinic on the women’s behalf. The information these services pro-
vided about abortion as an option was non-directive; the decision lay with
the woman herself.97 However, and as is clear from the litigation described
below, in the eyes of some anti-abortion campaigners, even the mere provi-
sion of non-directive information threatened the constitutional right to life
of the fetus. They argued that the State was obliged to prevent such access
to information in order to properly defend and vindicate fetal rights. With-
out such information, access to abortion was greatly limited, and they ar-
gued that the State was obligated to prevent such information provision in
order to properly defend and vindicate fetal rights.
In the late 1980s the Attorney General took a case at the relation of98
the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland (SPUC), seeking
an injunction preventing Open Door Counseling and the Well Woman
from providing such information on the basis that their activities were un-
lawful by reference to Article 40.3.3. The High Court issued this injunction
and, in doing so, made clear the extensive effects of the 8th Amendment.99
In Attorney General (SPUC) v. Open Door Counselling Ltd. and the
Wellwoman Centre Ltd., Hamilton P. started his judgment with the words
“The right to life of the unborn has always been recognised by Irish law.”100
This statement officially recognized fetal rights in the common law, further
solidifying its protection under the law “as one of the unenumerated per-
sonal rights” protected by the Constitution.101 In doing so, Hamilton P.
96. Roddy Flynn, The Development of Universal Telephone Service in Ireland 1880-1993
(unpublished Art.D. dissertation, Dublin City University), available at http://doras
.dcu.ie/18734/1/Roddy_Fynn_20130509140820.pdf (discussing the state of tele-
phone access in Ireland in the 1980s).
97. On the operation of these organizations, see generally ROSSITER, supra note 95
(describing the systems of support in Ireland and the United Kingdom for women
from Ireland seeking abortions after 1983).
98. That is, ex relatione, where the State brings a suit originally requested by a private
party with some interest in the matter.
99. See Att’y Gen. ex rel. Soc’y for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland, Ltd. v.
Open Door Counselling, Ltd. [1988] I.R. 593.
100. Open Door Counselling, [1988] I.R. 593, 597.
101. Open Door Counselling, [1988] I.R. at 597.  In Irish constitutional law, an
unenumerated right is a right that is deemed to have constitutional protection (i.e.,
to be powerful enough to result in the striking down of legislation found to violate
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construed criminal prohibitions on abortion as being statements of a fetal
right to life. By doing so, he constructed a pedigree for such a rights claim
that far predated the constitutional Amendment of 1983 and, indeed, the
judicial pronouncements of such a right from before that Amendment.102
The defendants argued that the court’s holding would effectively extend the
criminalization of abortion to the UK, where abortion was lawful when
administered under the Abortion Act 1967. In this respect, Hamilton P.
stated:
It seems to me that, where there is a breach of or interference
with a fundamental and personal and human right, such as the
right to life of the unborn, which is acknowledged by the Con-
stitution, and which the courts are under a constitutional obliga-
tion to defend and vindicate, it would be scandalous if the
legitimacy or criminality of such breach or interference could, in
the words of the late Kingsmill-Moore J. in Mayo-Perrott v.
Mayo-Perrott [1958] I.R. 336 at p. 350 of the report – “be de-
cided by a flight over St George’s Channel . . . . ”103
As a result, the court found that providing information and support to
women contemplating abortion “impl[ies] assent to, approval of, and en-
couragement for the procurement of an abortion if the pregnant woman so
wishes and the provisions of the Abortion Act, 1967, are complied with.”104
Hamilton P. went on to declare that he had “no doubt”105 that this was
unlawful by reference to Article 40.3.3:
[The] right to life of the unborn includes the right to have that
right preserved and defended and to be guarded against all
threats to its existence before and after birth . . . it lies not in the
power of a parent to terminate its existence and . . . any action
on the part of any person endangering that life [is] necessarily
it), notwithstanding the fact that it is not expressly protected in the text of the
Constitution itself. The doctrine has its origins in Ryan v. Att’y Gen., [1965] I.R.
294.
102. G. v. An Bord Uchta´la, [1978] I.R. 32, 69 (“Not only has the child born out of
lawful wedlock the natural right to have its welfare and health guarded no less well
than that of a child born in lawful wedlock, but a fortiori it has the right to life itself
and the right to be guarded against threats directed to its existence whether before or
after birth.”).
103. Att’y Gen. ex rel. Soc’y for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland, Ltd. v. Open
Door Counselling Ltd. and the Wellwoman Centre, Ltd, [1988] 1 I.R. 593, 610
(Ir.).
104. Open Door Counselling, [1988] 1 I.R. at 615.
105. Open Door Counselling, [1988] 1 I.R. at 616.
266 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 22:243
not only an offence against the common good but also against
the guaranteed personal rights of the human person in
question.106
Thus, women’s rights to information, association, travel, and bodily
autonomy were deemed entirely subordinate to the right to life of the fetus.
During pregnancy, women were labeled as mothers whose unborn children
had constitutional rights protected by the full weight of the law, and lost
their individual autonomy through limited rights to exercise equal citizen-
ship and autonomy separate from their fetuses. In spite of the evident ex-
tremity of the implications of Hamilton’s decision in this case, the Supreme
Court unanimously dismissed the appeal against this decision.107 The appel-
lants argued that the right to receive and communicate information was an
unenumerated right, and should be preserved. However, Chief Justice
Finlay responded by saying that he was “satisfied that no right could consti-
tutionally arise to obtain information the purpose of the obtaining of which
was to defeat the constitutional right to life of the unborn child.”108 A hier-
archy of rights had been firmly established.
Attorney General (SPUC) v. Open Door Counselling Ltd. and the
Wellwoman Centre Ltd. clearly indicated the extent to which the 8th
Amendment to the Constitution could impinge women’s autonomy with
respect to their reproductive decisions. Not only does this Amendment pre-
vent women from acquiring an abortion “at home” in Ireland, but it also
constrained their ability to receive information on abortion services available
abroad and to travel to receive an abortion. As a result, organizations such as
Open Door Counselling and Well Woman were prevented from providing
much assistance to women who were in need of information. Some UK-
published magazines that were sold in Ireland contained advertisements
about abortion services in that jurisdiction. While these remained on sale,
attempts by student unions to step into the breach and address the informa-
tion deficit under which women now suffered were also restrained by the
courts. In litigation initiated by SPUC against student union members,109
the Supreme Court confirmed that the prohibition on the provision of in-
formation outlined in Open Door Counselling was not limited to instances of
one-on-one information provision, but also included the provision of gen-
eral information in published form.110 According to Chief Justice Finlay,
“[i]t is clearly the fact that such information is conveyed to pregnant
106. Open Door Counselling, [1988] 1 I.R. at 617.
107. Open Door Counselling, [1988] 1 I.R. at 625.
108. Open Door Counselling, [1988] 1 I.R. at 625.
109. Soc’y for the Protection of the Unborn Child v. Grogan, [1989] I.R. 753.
110. Grogan, [1989] I.R. 753.
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women, and not the method of communication which creates the unconsti-
tutional illegality, and the judgment of this Court in the Open Door Coun-
selling case is not open to any other interpretation.”111
As already noted, these decisions were based, to a large extent, on the
contention that there was absolutely no right to access an abortion in Ire-
land. However, as outlined above, Attorney General v. X confirmed that the
8th Amendment had not introduced a total abortion prohibition. Rather,
there was a limited right to access abortion in Ireland where the life, as
opposed to the health, of a pregnant woman was at real and substantial risk
that could only be averted by termination of the pregnancy.112 This misin-
terpretation of the abortion law in Ireland spurred a response from Justice
Denham in the Supreme Court appeal in Society for the Protection of the
Unborn Child v. Grogan,113 criticizing the decision in Open Door Counsel-
ling. Denham claimed that the decision in Open Door Counselling was
flawed because it was based on an incorrect premise as to the meaning of
Article 40.3.3.114 This may well have led to an almost unworkable situation
in which women who had a constitutional right to access abortion under
the test outlined in X were entitled to travel and information, but others
were not. However, in 1992 the constitutional confirmation of women’s
right to travel and to access information, which applied to all women re-
gardless of their inability to access abortion in Ireland, avoided this
possibility.
B. Fetal Best Interests
Although it was originally thought that Article 40.3.3 dealt solely with
abortion, its wording is clearly capable of broader application. Not only
does Article 40.3.3 prohibit the introduction of widely available abortion,
but it also establishes an autonomous constitutional right to life of the fe-
tus.115 The reach of that fetal right to life is broad, and it continues to
111. Grogan, [1989] I.R. at 764.
112. Att’y Gen. v. X., [1992] 1 I.R. 1.
113. Soc’y for the Protection of the Unborn Child v. Grogan, [1997] I.E.S.C. 4.
114. Grogan, [1997] I.E.S.C. 4.
115. The Courts have not yet definitely settled the extent to which Article 40.3.3 may be
applicable across pregnancy (i.e., not only to decisions as to abortion). Thus, in
Roche v. Roche, [2009] I.E.S.C. 82 (Ir.), there was division between judges in the
Supreme Court on this point with then-Chief Justice Murray holding that the Arti-
cle can apply across pregnancy, while Justices Denham and Geoghagan found that it
applied to abortion only. In Att’y Gen. v. X., [1992] 1 I.R. 1 (Ir.) and Baby O. v.
Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform [2002] I.E.S.C. 53 (Ir.), the Court clearly
considered Article 40.3.3 to be concerned with questions of abortion only. For a full
discussion, see Ma´ire´ad Enright, Childbirth, Choice and the Courts: The 8th Amend-
ment and More, HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRELAND, Apr. 21, 2015, available at http://
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operate even where the right to life of the pregnant woman—expressly rec-
ognized in Article 40.3.3—no longer exists, i.e., where the pregnant woman
is clinically dead, but a fetal heartbeat remains. As the case PP v. HSE116
illustrates, this autonomous fetal right to life can result in “fetal best inter-
ests” and “fetal welfare” principles being applied to medical questions con-
cerning the care and treatment of the pregnant woman in a way that may
justify the imposition of extreme, dehumanizing, undignified and highly
invasive treatment.
PP concerned a young woman who suffered brain stem death when
she was 15 weeks pregnant. She was placed in intensive care and, although
clinically dead, was supported by mechanical ventilation, very heavy doses
of medication, and physiotherapy. The purpose of these interventions was
“to facilitate the continuation of maternal organ supportive measures in or-
der to attain fetal viability.”117 This process was likely to take 32 weeks.118
The woman’s father, plaintiff to the suit, sought a court order discontinuing
such intervention, which he considered to be unreasonable, experimental,
and unethical.119
The medical evidence given to the Court was harrowing. The
woman’s body was in a rapidly deteriorating state, her living children were
extremely distressed by her appearance, her brain was undertaking a process
of liquefaction (i.e., the softening of the brain into a liquid-like material),
she had an open wound in her skull from which brain tissue was extruding
and where there was evidence of fungal infection, she had cardiovascular
instability, and there were numerous other infections plaguing her body.
Medical expert testimony stated that given the extremely poor medical con-
dition of the pregnant woman, continuing treatment would “be going from
the extraordinary to the grotesque.”120 In spite of this, it was clear that with-
drawing care would result in the death of the fetus, and the question for the
court was whether that was permissible under Article 40.3.3 of the
Constitution.
In considering this question, the Court placed great weight on the
prospects of survival of the fetus, meaning the prospect of it being born alive
humanrights.ie/uncategorized/wanted-pregnancy-choice-and-the-courts-the-8th-
amendment-and-more/.
116. P.P. v. Health Serv. Exec., [2014] I.E.H.C. 622 (H. Ct.) (Ir.) (unreported).
117. P.P., [2014] I.E.H.C. at 2.
118. See P.P., [2014] I.E.H.C. at 5 (reporting the evidence of Dr. Brian Marsh, intensive
care medicine consultant). P.P., [2014] I.E.H.C. at 6 (Dr. Peter Boylan stated in
court that viability per se was generally accepted at being about 24 weeks gestation,
but given the surrounding circumstances of this case, “[h]e believed it should keep
going until 32 weeks when the chances of intact survival are much greater.”).
119. See P.P., [2014] I.E.H.C. at 2.
120. P.P., [2014] I.E.H.C. at 9.
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without regard to the quality or duration of life that would follow its
birth.121 Considering the extensive medical evidence presented, the Court
found that “the prospects for a successful delivery of a live baby in this case
are virtually non-existent”122 and that “there is no realistic prospect of con-
tinuing somatic support leading to the delivery of a live baby.”123 Having
made this finding of fact the Court proceeded to consider whether Article
40.3.3 permitted withdrawal of care.
In doing so, the Court focused largely on the “as far as practicable”
limitation clause in the constitutional text, and confirmed indications in
earlier jurisprudence that the State was not required to do that which was
futile, impractical, or ineffective in order to protect the fetal right to life.124
The Court held that, while women have a right to dignity in death, “when
the mother who dies is bearing an unborn child at the time of her death, the
rights of that child, who is living, and whose interests are not necessarily
inimical to those [of the woman], must prevail over the feelings of grief and
respect for a mother who is no longer living.”125 Having established this, the
Court went on to establish that “the question that must be addressed is
whether even if such measures are continued, there is a realistic prospect
that the child will be born alive.”126 Drawing on the wardship jurisprudence
in Irish courts (i.e. jurisprudence on when a court can take over decision-
making powers in respect of a child), the Court held that decisions as to
care ought to be made by reference to fetal best interests, bearing in mind
that “[g]iven the unborn in this jurisdiction enjoys and has the constitu-
tional guarantee of a right to life, the Court is satisfied that a necessary part
of vindicating that right is to enquire about the practicality and utility of
continuing life support measures.”127 Bearing this in mind, the Court held
that “[t]his unfortunate unborn has suffered the dreadful fate of being pre-
sent in the womb of a mother who has died, and in which the environment
is neither safe nor stable”128 and “has nothing but distress and death in
121. See P.P., [2014] I.E.H.C. at 15 (citing S.R. (A Ward of the Court), [2012] 1 I.R.
305, 323) (“In determining whether life-saving treatment should be withheld, the
paramount and principal consideration must be the best interests of the child. This
gives rise to a balancing exercise in which account should be taken of all circum-
stances, including . . . the longevity and quality of life that the child could expect if
he survives.”).
122. P.P., [2014] I.E.H.C. at 10.
123. P.P., [2014] I.E.H.C. at 10-11.
124. P.P., [2014] I.E.H.C. at 12-13 (citing Att’y Gen. v. X., [1992] 1 I.R. 1 (Ir.)).
125. P.P., [2014] I.E.H.C. at 13.
126. P.P., [2014] I.E.H.C. at 14.
127. P.P., [2014] I.E.H.C. at 16.
128. P.P., [2014] I.E.H.C. at 16.
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prospect.”129 Thus, it was considered to be “in the best interest of the un-
born child”130 to permit withdrawal of somatic care.
A number of commentators criticized the Health Service Executive for
contesting PP, claiming that the somatic care in this case could have been
withdrawn without litigation.131 However, both the judgment itself and the
medical evidence presented to the Court illustrate the possibility that a
brain-dead woman might be maintained by court order in order to ensure
the fetus reaches viability so that is can be delivered alive. This only adds to
the uncertainty under which medics must operate. The case does not offer
clarity on when Article 40.3.3 would require such intervention and when
care may be withdrawn, nor does it make clear whether this is something
that can be determined only by Courts rather than by medics. As claimed
by Dr. Peter Boylan, the lack of guidance as to how the 8th Amendment
works in such cases was a material consideration in the decision to both
prolong the somatic care and engage in litigation.132 It is quite possible that
such a situation would arise in similar cases in the future.
The relevance of Article 40.3.3 to such cases is confirmed by the
Court’s finding that this provision is not limited in its application to abor-
tion. Rather, “the provision, in its plain and ordinary meaning may also be
seen as acknowledging in simple terms the right to life of the unborn which
the State, as far as practicable, shall by its laws defend and vindicate.”133
Furthermore, this case makes clear that withdrawing support in cases of this
kind is determined solely by reference to whether the fetus will be born
alive. In PP, the fact that there was no prospect of live birth made maintain-
ing care more than that which was “practicable” by reference to Article
40.3.3. Another set of facts could have led to another finding; what mat-
tered in coming to the conclusion that the care could be withdrawn in PP
was the Court’s determination of what was in the best interests of the fetus
in order to achieve its live birth.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICINE: FETOCENTRICITY
IN DECISION-MAKING
The potential implications of the finding in PP that “fetal best inter-
ests” should be taken into account in making decisions as to maternal medi-
129. P.P., [2014] I.E.H.C. at 16.
130. P.P., [2014] I.E.H.C. at 16.
131. For some criticisms of the case by medical professionals and attorneys, see John
Drennan & Daniel McConnell, Right-to-Die Case is One of ‘Horror and Absurdity,’
IRISH INDEPENDENT (Dec. 28, 2014), http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/news/
righttodie-case-is-one-of-horror-and-absurdity-30865801.html.
132. P.P., [2014] I.E.H.C. at 6.
133. P.P., [2014] I.E.H.C. at 13.
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cal care are extraordinarily far-reaching. If the fetal right to life takes
precedence over a woman’s health, autonomy, and bodily integrity (which it
does under Article 40.3.3), and if that fetus also has a “best interest” in
being born alive, then PP may pervade medical decision-making throughout
a pregnancy, giving a crystallized legal form to the practice of fetocentric
medical care that pregnant women receive in Ireland. This practice is illus-
trated by cases of “fatal fetal abnormality,” i.e., situations where the fetus
will almost certainly die in utero or very shortly after birth but where there is
no “real and substantial” risk to the pregnant woman’s life. There is an
apparent willingness to override a woman’s refusal of consent to postpone
the treatment in order to preserve fetal life. Furthermore, there are fresh
indications that Article 40.3.3 is being given an extremely wide interpreta-
tion in some hospitals, impacting decisions concerning referrals for particu-
lar procedures abroad. For example, it has been reported that in one major
hospital, referrals abroad for pre-implantation genetic diagnosis134 have been
stopped135—a situation that has clear implications for women’s maternal
healthcare, reproductive choices, and access to the best available standard of
healthcare.
A. Fatal Fetal Abnormalities
The term “fatal fetal abnormality” is now used in Ireland to refer to
fetuses that suffer from a condition that means they are highly unlikely to
be born alive or, if born alive, will almost certainly have a short life and
suffer from a serious medical condition.136 Pregnant women in Ireland who
134. “Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) enables people with an inheritable condi-
tion in their family to avoid passing it on to their children. It involves checking the
genes and/or chromosomes of embryos created through IVF.” Pre-implantation Ge-
netic Diagnosis (PGD), HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY
(UK), April 1, 2014, available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/preimplantation-genetic-
diagnosis.html.
135. See Paul Cullen, Crumlin Referrals for Embryo Screening Halted on Legal Advice, IRISH
TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/health/crumlin-
referrals-for-embryo-screening-halted-on-legal-advice-1.2012400 (reporting that
Our Lady’s Children’s Hospital in Crumlin, Dublin stopped referring patients
abroad for pre-implantation genetic diagnosis after receiving legal advice that the
referrals could be unconstitutional).
136. “Fatal fetal abnormality” is not an exact medical term, but has gained popularity in
public affairs discussions of such cases. See Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act
(Amendment) 2013 (Bill No. 115/2013) (Ir.) (The bill defined the term as “a medi-
cal condition suffered by a foetus such that it is incompatible with life outside the
womb.” That private-members bill, introduced by Clare Daly, Deputy, was eventu-
ally defeated); see also Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act (Amendment) 2015
(Bill No. 20/2015) (Ir.) (This private-members bill, introduced by Michael McNa-
mara, Deputy, defined the term as “a medical condition, or medical conditions,
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wish to terminate the pregnancy in such circumstances cannot avail them-
selves of an abortion in Ireland because Article 40.3.3 has been interpreted
as allowing an abortion only where there is a risk to the life of the pregnant
woman. This is notwithstanding the fact that the term “as far as practicable”
might reasonably be interpreted as permitting an abortion where there is
practically no likelihood of the fetus being born alive.137 Indeed, to some
extent the availability of an abortion in such circumstances is suggested by
the decision in PP v. HSE, discussed above. In this case the High Court
paid close attention to whether the fetus had any prospect of being born
alive when determining whether to allow the withdrawal of somatic care to
a clinically dead pregnant woman, which resulted in fetal death. However,
the Court in PP was careful to limit its decision to its own particular facts,
so that no general principle of the permissibility of abortions in such cases
can be reasonably deduced.
Neither the government nor the present Attorney General has en-
dorsed these more liberal interpretations, and medics operate on the under-
standing that abortion is not permissible in Ireland in cases of fatal fetal
abnormalities. Thus, in cases where there is little prospect of a baby being
born alive or surviving for long after birth, doctors may advise patients of
the option to terminate and provide information about abortion, although
they can neither provide that abortion in Ireland nor refer them specifically
for a termination in the UK.138 Rather, pregnant women in these situations
must travel for an abortion should they decide to terminate their pregnancy.
Not only does this reflect a remarkably narrow interpretation of the
Constitution, but it also imposes severe burdens on women who are already
in very difficult positions. First, as previously mentioned, no doctor, nurse,
or medical professional in Ireland can arrange a referral for a pregnant
woman to go to a hospital or clinic in the UK where an abortion could be
performed. Second, women in these situations must carry additional finan-
suffered by a foetus which results in that foetus having no prospect of being born
alive.”).
137. See D. v. Ireland, App. No. 26499/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) (arguing that because of
the lack of a domestic decision, it was possible that an Irish court could find that a
fetus incapable of being born alive did not attract the protection of the Constitution
and therefore an abortion may have been possible in the applicant’s situation). See
generally Roche v. Roche, [2009] 2 I.R. 321 (S. C.) (discussing whether fertilized but
unimplanted embryos have a right to life under the Constitution); Jennifer
Schweppe & Eimear Spain, Interpreting “Life” in the Protection of Life During Preg-
nancy Act 2013, 20 MEDICO-LEGAL J. IR. 93 (2014) (describing how the emphasis
has shifted from how the courts will interpret “unborn” in a constitutional sense to
how the courts will interpret the term “life”).
138. Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of
Pregnancies) (Act No. 5/1995) (Ir.).
2015] C O N S T I T U T I O N A L I Z I N G  F E T A L  R I G H T S 273
cial and emotional burdens and it is reported that women increasingly have
the first part of the procedure undertaken in the UK and then “deliver” the
deceased fetus in an Irish hospital.139 In spite of this, doctors based in Ire-
land are left without any options to help their patients in these situations;
they can merely inform them that there are hospitals in the UK where they
might be able to access abortion and provide care for them on their return.
The continued criminalization of abortion under the Protection of Life
During Pregnancy Act 2013 means that doctors will not, and cannot, use
their medical judgment to determine whether or not a given situation might
permit an abortion in Ireland under PP. In reality, should a pregnant
woman whose fetus is diagnosed as having a fatal abnormality want to ac-
cess an abortion in Ireland, she would almost certainly have to undertake
the financial, emotional, and media burdens of seeking a court order to
determine whether she can do so. In such fraught and difficult circum-
stances, this is almost certain to be too heavy a burden to bear for most
women and couples in such situations.
B. Sick, but Not (Yet) Dying
The constitutionalization of fetal rights creates many medical difficul-
ties particularly for women who require medical treatment during their
pregnancy. Where women who are pregnant require medical treatment that
may result in the death of the fetus but where there is not (yet) a real and
substantial risk to life, the “chilling effect”140 of the criminalization of abor-
tion can operate to determine medical decision-making. This chilling effect
has pervaded medical decision-making in Ireland in such a way that fetal life
is saved at the expense of the pregnant woman’s health. In some cases, even
though termination of the pregnancy would be best for the health of the
pregnant woman, current medical practice in Ireland leans toward preserv-
ing the pregnancy and risking the woman’s health.141 As Dr. Rhona
Mahony, the Master of the National Maternity Hospital, has stated:
From a medical perspective, [Article 40.3.3] creates difficulty in
its presumption that the implications of a range of complex
medical disorders can be reduced to a matter of individual right.
139. Susan Mitchell, UK Hospitals Move to Limit Irish Abortions, SUNDAY BUS. POST,
(Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.businesspost.ie/uk-hospitals-move-to-limit-irish-abor-
tions/.
140. This phrase was used by the European Court of Human Rights in A, B & C v.
Ireland, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 13 (2011).
141. Marge Berer, Termination of Pregnancy as Emergency Obstetric Care: The Interpretation
of Catholic Health Policy and the Consequences for Pregnant Women, 21 REPROD.
HEALTH MATTERS 9 (2013).
274 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 22:243
If the legal world explores the balance of rights, the medical
world explores the balance of risk . . . The wording of the Eighth
Amendment is sufficiently ambiguous that there is a real risk
that medical imperative could be hindered by an emphasis on
balance of rights rather than survival [of the pregnant
woman].142
This was starkly illustrated by the death of Savita Halappanavar.
Savita Halappanavar died in a Galway hospital before the enactment
of the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013. Ms. Halappanavar
was admitted to hospital while suffering a miscarriage 17 weeks into her
pregnancy; there was no prospect of the fetus surviving, although there was
a fetal heartbeat at the time. Reports suggest that she requested termination
of the pregnancy by means of abortion as soon as the diagnosis became
clear. However, because her life was not in “real and substantial danger” at
the time, and the fetus still had a heartbeat, this request was denied. This
continued over a period of almost three days, during which time the clinical
approach was “to ‘await events’ and to monitor the fetal heart in case an
accelerated delivery might be possible once the fetal heart stopped.”143 Due
to the delay in treatment, Ms. Halappanavar developed a very serious form
of sepsis, a “[s]ystemic illness caused by microbial invasion of normally ster-
ile parts of the body”.144 The advance of the sepsis was not adequately diag-
nosed or treated. Although the fetal remains were removed on October 24,
the infection worsened and she died on October 28, 2012.
An independent inquiry found that multiple factors were relevant in
this case, including the lack of clear clinical and legal guidance. The inquiry,
thus
[S]trongly recommend[ed] and advise[d] the clinical professional
community, health and social care regulators and the Oireachtas
to consider the law including any necessary constitutional
change and related administrative, legal and clinical guidelines in
relation to the management of inevitable miscarriage in the early
second trimester of a pregnancy including with prolonged rup-
142. Rhona Mahony, Protecting Life in Real Life—An Essay, MEDICO-LEGAL J. IR. 104,
105 (2014).
143. HEALTH SERV. EXEC., FINAL REPORT: INVESTIGATION OF INCIDENT 50278 FROM
TIME OF PATIENT’S SELF REFERRAL TO HOSPITAL ON THE 21ST OF OCTOBER 2012
TO THE PATIENT’S DEATH ON THE 28TH OF OCTOBER, 2012 5 (2013) [hereinafter
FINAL REPORT].
144. Andrew Lever & Iain Mackenzie, Sepsis: Definition, Epidemiology, and Diagnosis, 335
BRIT. MED. J. 879, 879 (2007).
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ture of membranes and where the risk to the mother increases
with time from the time that membranes are ruptured including
the risk of infection and thereby reduce risk of harm up to and
including death.145
Although some claimed that this case illustrated failures in medical care
rather than a difficulty with the 8th Amendment, Enright and de Londras
have argued that the constitutional position was relevant in the clinical deci-
sions taken in this case and the death of Savita Halappanavar:
This case was dominated by the sense that even an inevitable
miscarriage could not be terminated as long as there was foetal
heartbeat on the basis that a real and substantial risk to the life of
the pregnant woman must first arise. This interpretation of the
Constitution clearly played into both Savita Halappanavar’s pro-
tracted suffering and her death . . . the reality is that the thresh-
old for access to abortion in Ireland is so high that even a serious
illness is likely to be managed along similar lines, regardless of
the outcome for the woman.146
C. Overriding Consent
Although it did not involve abortion per se, the decision in PP v. HSE,
considered above, is entirely congruent with this reading of what happened
to Savita Halappanavar. It shows that under the 8th Amendment, doctors
may be required to go to great lengths to preserve fetal life without regard
for whether this will result in the best medical outcomes for the pregnant
woman. The consent of the pregnant woman does not seem to be a key
issue in deciding whether to undertake such treatment: Savita Halappanavar
expressly requested an abortion, and the patient in PP was clinically dead
and could neither consent nor refuse to consent to the invasive “treatment”
to which her body was subjected. In some cases, the Health Services Execu-
tive has attempted to override a pregnant woman’s lack of consent by apply-
ing for court orders for treatment that were oriented towards maintaining
fetal life. The Irish National Consent Policy (i.e., the policy outlining what
consent means and how it is to be established in all healthcare interven-
tions) suggests that this might be the appropriate course of action. The
Policy provides:
145. FINAL REPORT, supra note 143, at 6.
146. Ma´ire´ad Enright & Fiona de Londras, “Empty Without and Empty Within”: the Un-
workability of the Eighth Amendment After Savita Halappanavar and Miss Y, 20
MEDICO-LEGAL J. IR. 85, 85-86 (2014).
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The consent of a pregnant woman is required for all health and
social care interventions. However, because of the constitutional
provisions on the right to life of the “unborn,” there is signifi-
cant legal uncertainty regarding the extent of a pregnant
woman’s right to refuse treatment in circumstances in which the
refusal would put the life of a viable foetus at serious risk. In
such circumstances, legal advice should be sought as to whether
an application to the High Court is necessary.147
The case of “Miss Y” illustrates a tendency towards overriding the
consent of the pregnant woman in order to preserve fetal life. Although the
case is subject to strict reporting requirements, the following appears to be
clear from the publicly available information. Y entered Ireland, seeking asy-
lum, and discovered shortly after that she was pregnant as a result of a
wartime rape in her country of origin.148 She made it clear that she did not
want to proceed with the pregnancy and that, if forced to do so, she would
kill herself. For reasons that are not entirely clear, no referral for assessment
was made under the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 until
she was approximately 20 weeks along. Although the assessment revealed
that there was a real and substantial risk to her health under § 9 of the Act,
the abortion was not carried out because the fetus was viable.
Y protested her inability to access to an abortion by refusing to eat and
putting the fetus at risk.149 In response, the HSE acquired court orders to
force Y to consume food and water.150 Although it appears that Y eventually
agreed to eat and drink, the fact that such court orders were sought and
granted indicates the extent to which fetal welfare can influence medical
treatment.  Y’s asylum status makes this case even more disturbing. Y could
not easily travel to the UK for an abortion, nor could she work in order to
raise the money to afford one. In Ireland, a person who is seeking asylum is
not permitted to work,151 and thus she could not earn money to afford such
a procedure. Once the pregnancy had progressed further—reportedly to 24
weeks—it was terminated by means of a cesarean section.152 While no court
147. HEALTH SERV. EXEC., NAT’L CONSENT POL’Y (2014), http://www.hse.ie/eng/about/
Who/qualityandpatientsafety/National_Consent_Policy/consenttrainerresource/train
erfiles/NationalConsentPolicyM2014.pdf.
148. For an overview of what is publicly known about this case, see Kitty Holland, Time-




151. Refugee Act 1996 (Act. No. 17/1996) § 9(4)(b) (Ir.), available at http://www.irish-
statutebook.ie/1996/en/act/pub/0017/.
152. Holland, supra note 148.
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order was acquired to authorize this invasive procedure, clear questions arise
as to Y’s capacity to truly consent to such a procedure. She was a young,
suicidal woman who had been denied an abortion that she wanted, did not
speak much English, was in a highly vulnerable position, had been raped,
and was living within Ireland’s punitive asylum system. Indeed, so oppres-
sive was her treatment that she is currently suing the State in respect of it.153
All of these cases illustrate the fact that the 8th Amendment has re-
sulted in a jurisprudential reclassification of pregnant women as constitu-
tional subjects: once a woman becomes pregnant, medical and legal priority
shifts to the fetus, the protection of which, Supreme Court jurisprudence
has declared, is in pursuance of the “public interest.”154 In contrast, the
protection and vindication of pregnant women’s rights is not of interest, or
at least not when these rights are in conflict with fetal rights or fetal best
interests. This is the jurisprudential and medical consequence of constitu-
tionalizing fetal rights, and it is a state of affairs that causes real hardship for
women in Ireland.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN: THE ILLUSION OF “CHOICE”
AND THE REALITY OF HARDSHIP
The cases considered in Parts IV and V demonstrate the pervasiveness
of fetal-rights thinking, anchored in constitutionalized fetal rights, in flesh-
ing out the legal and medical implications of Article 40.3.3. While pregnant
women’s constitutional rights to information and travel have been estab-
lished by the 13th and 14th Amendments, the State’s vindication of consti-
tutionalized fetal rights subjects pregnant women in Ireland to violations of
their rights to bodily integrity,155 freedom from inhuman and degrading
153. Mark Tighe, Ms Y Issues Nine Abortion Lawsuits, SUNDAY TIMES (Apr. 12, 2015),
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/homeV2/article1543004.ece.
154. Soc’y for the Protection of Unborn Children, Ltd. v. Coogan, [1989] I.R. 734 (Ir.)
(Walsh J.) (establishing that S.P.U.C. had standing to litigate on behalf of the un-
born child due to the public interest in protecting fetal constitutional rights).
155. Protected as an unenumerated right in the Irish Constitution under Ryan v. Att’y
Gen., [1965] I.R. 294.
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treatment,156 privacy,157 access to adequate healthcare,158 and reproductive
autonomy.159
In order to avoid these violations, many women in Ireland travel
abroad to access abortion.  Indeed, the availability of abortion in England
(under the Abortion Act 1967) and the relative ease of travel between Ire-
land and the UK, have allowed for the illusion and the language of choice to
enter into the Irish abortion debate. The argument maintains that it is not
that women in Ireland cannot have abortions; but rather, that women can-
not have abortions in Ireland. This slight of hand, which contrives to pre-
sent Irish women as having reproductive autonomy, deliberately elides the
fact that women with different socio-economic resources have vastly differ-
ent capacities to exercise what amounts to a right to be an abortion tourist
in Ireland.160
Travelling for an abortion is not easy: it is time consuming, costly, and
often lonely. The practicalities of arranging for an abortion may result in
delayed treatment and thus a more expensive and more dangerous abortion.
The practical considerations of cost alone are significant. On average, it
156. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40.3.4; European Convention on Human Rights, art. 3, Nov.
4, 1950, Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, ETS
5; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966,
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171; UN Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984,
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85.
157. Recognized as an unenumerated right in McGee v. Att’y Gen., [1974] I.R. 284 (Ir.);
European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, Council of Europe,
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, ETS 5; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol.
999, p. 171.
158. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12, Dec. 16,
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3. It is unclear whether there is a
right to health and healthcare under Irish constitutional law. In Heeney v. Dublin Co.
[1998] I.E.S.C. 26 (Ir.), the Court held “there is a hierarchy of constitutional rights
and at the top of the list is the right to life, followed by the right to health . . . .”
However, in the later case of In re Article 26 of the Constitution and the Health
(Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2004, [2005] 1 I.R. 105 (Ir.), the Supreme Court refused
to recognize a right to health that would create an obligation on the part of the State
to provide healthcare without cost.
159. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 21 Sess.,
U.N. Doc. 54/38/Rev.1; GAOR, 54th Sess. Supp. No. 38, pt. II 180 (June 1999)
(concluding observations on Ireland).
160. Mary Gilmartin & Allen White, Interrogating Medical Tourism: Ireland, Abortion,
and Mobility Rights 36 SIGNS 275, 277 (2011).
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costs a woman in Ireland C= 1,000 to go to the UK for an abortion.161 Al-
though there are some volunteer organizations that can help women with
this expense,162 the Irish State does not provide any financial assistance or
reimburse costs. Moreover, women who already have children may have to
arrange childcare while traveling for the procedure, and women with jobs
will have to take time off of work. Poor women are particularly disadvan-
taged in this context. So too are asylum-seeking women who are not enti-
tled to work163 and thus have very limited independent resources, and who
also must acquire a special travel visa.164 The visa process alone costs be-
tween C= 120 and C= 240 and can take up to eight weeks, after which there is
no guarantee the visa will be granted.165 While women are entitled to medi-
cal care in Ireland following an abortion abroad, many women experience
abortion stigma and do not seek out medical care or support from friends
and family.166
Ireland’s proximity to the UK, where abortion is permitted, has al-
lowed the Irish government to continuously avoid addressing abortion
rights in Ireland. Despite the close proximity of the two jurisdictions, the
distance across the Irish Sea is substantial enough to make it difficult for
many Irish women to make the trip. In reality, the “choice” to travel in
order to have an abortion is, for many, utterly illusory. Between 1980 and
2013, it was reported that 158,252 women with Irish addresses accessed
abortion in England,167 which leaves one to wonder how many women had
no option but to attempt abortion by other means or to continue with an
unwanted pregnancy.
161. See also ABORTION SUPPORT NETWORK, https://www.abortionsupport.org.uk/
about-the-women-we-help/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
162. For example, the Abortion Support Network. On the history of Irish women’s orga-
nizations in London supporting women from Ireland who travel to the UK to access
abortion, see, e.g., ROSSITER, supra note 95.
163. Refugee Act 1996 (Act. No. 17/1996) § 9(4)(b) (Ir.), available at http://www.irish-
statutebook.ie/1996/en/act/pub/0017/.
164. IRISH FAMILY PLANNING ASS’N, Comments of the Irish Family Planning Association
(IFPA) in Respect of the Fourth Periodic Review of Ireland Under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 7 (2014), available at http://www.ifpa
.ie/sites/default/files/documents/submissions/irish_family_planning_association_re_
4th_periodic_review_of_ireland.pdf.
165. Id. at 7.
166. Id. at 10.
167. IRISH FAMILY PLANNING ASS’N, Abortion in Ireland: Statistics, https://www.ifpa.ie/
Hot-Topics/Abortion/Statistics (last visited September 25, 2015).
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VII. TOWARDS A REFERENDUM ON THE 8TH AMENDMENT
For most Irish people, and many Irish politicians, the dissonance be-
tween the constitutional myth of an abortion-free Ireland and the reality of
Irish reproductive choice is stark.168 High profile cases illustrating the sharp-
ness and pervasiveness of the constitutionalized fetal right to life make that
clear. So too does the plight of women and couples who have had to travel
to the UK (or further afield) to terminate a pregnancy in the case of fatal
fetal abnormality. Desire, perhaps even demand, for change is palpable,
with the claims that change is needed concerning pregnancy issues emanat-
ing from rape and incest, as well as cases of fatal fetal abnormality.
This has been evident in a succession of opinion polls over recent
months. The most recent of these polls suggest that support for some con-
stitutional change concerning abortion is especially strong. According to a
Sunday Independent/Millward Brown poll in September 2014, 75% of
those surveyed were in favor of holding a referendum to repeal the 8th
Amendment and 69% believed abortion should be available in cases of
rape.169 An Irish Times/Ipsos MORI poll held in October 2014 largely re-
produced this picture, with 68% of those surveyed being in favor of holding
a referendum on whether to allow abortion in cases of rape and fatal fetal
abnormality.170 An Amnesty International survey published in July 2015
shows that 67% of those surveyed favored the decriminalization of abor-
tion.171 While such polls do not, of course, indicate that a referendum to
change the constitutional status quo would necessarily be successful, they do
indicate that there is significant desire for the constitutional provision to be
168. See, e.g., Fiach Kelly, Existing Abortion Laws are ‘Too Restrictive’, Says Leo Varadkar,
THE IRISH TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014. 11:21 AM), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/
politics/existing-abortion-laws-are-too-restrictive-says-leo-varadkar-1.2040072 (re-
porting on the comments of Minister of Health Leo Varadkar); Fiach Kelly, Burton
Says Abortion Laws Do Not Serve Women Well, THE IRISH TIMES (Dec. 20, 2014,
1:00 AM), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/joan-burton-says-abortion-
laws-do-not-serve-women-well-1.2044589 (reporting Ta´naiste [Deputy Prime Min-
ister] Joan Burton’s comments that the current law is ill-suited to the needs of
women).
169. MILLWARD BROWN, National Opinion Poll: September 2014, 1, 29-30 (Sept. 21,
2014), available at http://www.millwardbrown.com/docs/default-source/ireland-
downloads/opinion-polls/sunday-independent-september-2014-poll.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
170. Stephen Collins, Majority of Voters Want Abortion Laws Liberalised, THE IRISH TIMES
(Oct. 13, 2014, 5:34 PM), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/majority-
of-voters-want-abortion-law-liberalised-1.1961142.
171. AMNESTY INT’L, New Poll Finds Two-Thirds Majority in Ireland Wants Abortion
Decriminalised (July 8, 2015), https://www.amnesty.ie/news/new-poll-finds-two-
thirds-majority-ireland-want-abortion-decriminalised.
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revisited. There is also significant political momentum, in at least some
quarters, towards a referendum.
While some have focused on attempting to bring change through leg-
islation (such as through private members’ bills to allow abortion in cases of
fatal fetal abnormality172), the general political consensus is that any reform
whatsoever requires constitutional change. The current coalition govern-
ment has made it clear that it has no intention of revisiting the question of
abortion during its tenure (scheduled to end in 2016),173 but two parties—
the Labour Party174 and Sinn Fe´in175—have officially voted in favor of con-
stitutional reform, thus making repeal of the 8th Amendment a core ele-
ment of their party policies for the next general election.
While this level of momentum is notable, its substantive scale ought
not to be overstated. The emergent consensus for constitutional change ap-
pears to be gathering around making abortion available in the very limited
circumstances of pregnancy arising from rape and incest, and in cases of
fatal fetal abnormality. What has not yet come fully into public discourse is
a demand for constitutional recognition of women’s reproductive autonomy
as a general matter (i.e., beyond these limited situations). This suggests that
the constitutionalization of fetal rights continues to dominate political and
popular imagination in respect of reform and, thus, to greatly curtail the
possibilities for constitutional change.
The constitutionalization of fetal rights must be grappled with to en-
sure the success of any constitutional referendum that is designed to recog-
nize women’s autonomy.  This phenomenon may significantly frame both
172. Thus far, two such bills have been introduced: Protection of Life During Pregnancy
Act 2013 (Act No. 35/2013), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2013/
en.act.2013.0035.pdf, and the Protection of Life During Pregnancy (Amendment)
(Act No. 20/2015), available at http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/bills/
2015/2015/b2015d.pdf.
173. See, e.g., Daniel McConnell, Taoiseach: We Have Been Clear That Abortion is an Issue
for the Next Government, THE IRISH INDEPENDENT (Feb. 11, 2015, 10:43 AM),
http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/politics/taoiseach-we-have-been-clear-that-
abortion-is-an-issue-for-the-next-government-30983287.html (reporting on the
statement of Taoiseach [Prime Minister] Enda Kenny).
174. Michael O’Regan, Labour Delegates Call for Eighth Amendment to be Repealed, THE
IRISH TIMES (Mar. 1, 2015, 7:39 PM), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/
labour-delegates-call-for-eighth-amendment-to-be-repealed-1.2121598.
175. At their third A´rd Eheis [party conference], Sinn Fe´in voted both to allow abortion
in cases of fatal fetal abnormality and repeal the Eighth Amendment. Marie
O’Halloran, Sinn Fe´in Delegates Support Abortion for Fatal Foetal Abnormalities, THE
IRISH TIMES (Mar. 7, 2015, 8:12 PM), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/
sinn-f%C3%A9in-delegates-support-abortion-for-fatal-foetal-abnormalities-1.21308
35.
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the form of the proposed change and the nature of the discourse during the
referendum campaign itself.
Referenda are a very particular part of Irish political life; they are rarely
proposed without cross-party consensus and they tend to result in an impas-
sioned public debate.176 That debate is itself framed by constitutional re-
quirements of “balance” in terms of the expenditure of public funds and the
allocation of time by public broadcasters when discussing the issues in ques-
tion.177 In practice, these legal constraints mean that social issues are often
framed as a polarized debate, with little “middle ground” discussion taking
place in the “public square.” As mentioned above, the 1983 referendum was
preceded by two years of intense lobbying to force associations and institu-
tions to make their position on the question of abortion clear. Although the
Roman Catholic Church is unlikely to play as prominent a role in any fu-
ture referendum campaign as it did in 1983, the anti-abortion lobby re-
mains well-organized and well-resourced. Founded on Catholic ethos, the
Iona Institute is a prominent institution that has an extremely high-profile
public presence in all debates on social issues. Thus, while it seems unlikely
that a future referendum would take on quite the same tone of previous
ones, two important trends that were present in those campaigns are likely
to inform any forthcoming referendum: the representation of abortion as
“un-Irish” and externally imposed, and the language of “fetal rights.”
Abortion has long been represented as utterly alien to Irish morality
and the Irish way of life, with fetocentrism and the constitutionalization of
fetal rights marking a particular moral position of the Irish people and State.
In the campaign leading to the referendum on the 8th Amendment in
1983, this took on a manifestly “anti-English” tone, with abortion being
represented as a tool of colonial oppression.178 One famous poster in the
campaign made that representation manifest: it carried the line “The Abor-
tion Mills of England Grind Irish Babies into Blood that Cries Out to
Heaven for Vengeance.”179 Some claimed that any attempt to liberalize
176. See generally de Londras & Morgan, supra note 65, at 179-202 (detailing Ireland’s
referendum procedure and voters’ involvement in passing amendments).
177. The government may not expend public monies to promote a particular result in a
referendum, following the decision of the Supreme Court in McKenna v. An
Taoiseach (No. 2), [1995] 2 I.R. 10 (Ir.). Furthermore, television and radio broad-
casts must give equal time to “yes” and “no” campaigns in referenda, following
Coughlan v. Broad. Complaints Comm’n & RTE´, [2000] 3 I.R. 1 (Ir.).
178. See, e.g., Ruth Fletcher, Post-colonial Fragments: Representations of Abortion in Irish
Law and Politics, 28 J.L. & SOC’Y 568 (2001); Mullally, supra note 44.
179. For an excellent discussion of this poster, see Sophie Cacciaguidi-Fahy, The Substan-
tive Issue and the Rhetoric of the Abortion Debate in Ireland, in CONTEMPORARY IS-
SUES OF THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW 141, 147 (Anne Wagner et al. eds., 2005).
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abortion law in Ireland was at danger of turning Ireland back into a mere
province of the United Kingdom.180
Although the tone had changed by the time of the referendum of
1992, it remained the case that abortion was represented as an external
“threat” to Ireland’s particular moral position on fetal life. In this context
the suggestion was that EU law might result in Ireland being forced to legal-
ize abortion. To some extent this flowed from the European Court of Jus-
tice’s decision in Grogan.181 That case, discussed in its domestic legal
incarnation above, concerned whether or not abortion was a service as un-
derstood within the Treaty of Rome, such that any restrictions on abortion
(including travel and information) might be a violation of the Treaty and
were thus invalid even if they took constitutional form. The European
Court of Justice held that abortion is a service as understood within the
Treaty of Rome and therefore the government could not restrict the adver-
tisements and dissemination of information by parties commercially in-
vested in abortion services.182 This case resulted in a perception of EC law as
a threat to the constitutional protection of fetal rights in Ireland.
This became significant in the context of the 1992 referendum, which
followed the X Case, because at the time the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty was also under consideration. During this time, it emerged that Ire-
land had negotiated a protocol to the Treaty that made it clear none of its
provisions would interfere with Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution.183 There
was much uncertainty and debate about the legal effect of this protocol,
which threatened to derail the effort to secure popular support for ratifica-
tion of the Maastricht Treaty;184 indeed, Jennifer Spreng noted that the ref-
erendum on the Maastricht Treaty “became a preliminary de facto vote on
abortion rights.”185 Abortion has continued to play a role in EU Treaty
referenda ever since, with the concern that the EU might “impose” abortion
180. See, e.g., DESMOND FENNELL, NICE PEOPLE & REDNECKS: IRELAND IN THE 1980s
(1986).
181. Case No. C-159/90, Soc’y for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland, Ltd. v.
Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. 4685.
182. On the failure of this decision to meaningfully consider women’s rights, see Mullally,
supra note 44, at 91.
183. Treaty on European Union, Protocol 17, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 325/5).
184. In Ireland, changes to EU Treaties that alter “the essential scope or objectives of the
Communities” must be approved by referendum before they can be ratified by the
Government. Crotty v. An Taoiseach, [1987] I.R. 713, 767 (Ir.). See Gavin Barrett,
Building a Swiss Chalet in an Irish Legal Landscape? Referendums on European Union
Treaties in Ireland & the Impact of Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 5 EUR. CONST. L.
REV. 32 (2009).
185. JENNIFER E. SPRENG, ABORTION AND DIVORCE LAW IN IRELAND 128 (2004).
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liberalization. However, there is no evidence that this is likely or even
possible.186
By the 2000s the discourse had shifted somewhat, from virulent anti-
and post-colonial sentiment to a deep concern with the extent to which
international human rights law might “impose” an obligation to liberalize
abortion law on Ireland. In spite of the fact that abortion and access thereto
is a matter on which there is extremely limited normative content in inter-
national human rights law, and one on which the European Court of
Human Rights has not articulated a clear position vis-a`-vis either Article 2
(the right to life) or Article 8 (the right to private and family life),187 the
anti-abortion lobby was suspicious and almost hostile toward even minimal-
ist interventions from the international legal order. This is exemplified by
the reaction to the European Court of Human Rights decision in A, B & C
v. Ireland.188
In that case, the European Court reiterated that it was for the member
State to decide the extent to which abortion would be available in the do-
mestic legal system;189 this was a matter on which the State had such a wide
margin of discretion that a strongly held national position against liberal
abortion provision could override European consensus as to availability.190
However, as the Court had previously held,191 where the law does allow for
186. For an overview of EU referendum debates in Ireland, including the influence of
“the abortion question,” see Jane O’Mahony, Ireland’s EU Referendum Experience, 24
IRISH POL. STUD. 429 (2009).
187. For an overview of Euopean Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence on abortion, see
Daniel Fenwick, The Modern Abortion Jurisprudence under Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 12 MED. L. INT’L 249 (2012).
188. A, B & C v. Ireland, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 13 (2011). For example, in evidence before
the Oireachtas [Parliamentary] Joint Committee on Health and Children, William
Binchy claimed, “The European Court does not require us to give legislative sub-
stance to such an unjust and mistaken decision. What it requires is something quite
different: that our law on medical care during pregnancy be transparent and that
there be a possibility of review or appeal from medical decisions. It is not the busi-
ness of the European Court to tell Ireland what choices to make in relation to the
protection of mothers and children. To say that the European Court requires us to
legislate in accordance with the Supreme Court decision is patently untrue.” William
Binchy, Opening Statement to the Joint Committee on Health and Children, HOUSES
OF THE OIREACHTAS, available at http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/com-
mittees/healthandchildren/William-Binchy.pdf. See also David Quinn, Ireland Con-
tinues the Good Fight, 37 HUM. LIFE REV. 140 (2011).
189. A, B & C, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at paras. 229-41 (2011).
190. See Fiona de Londras & Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Grand Chamber of the European
Court of Human Rights, A, B and C v. Ireland, Decision of 17 December 2010, 62
INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 250, 255-57 (2013) (regarding the “trumping” of European
consensus by “profound moral values” in Ireland).
191. See Tysiac v. Poland, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 42 (2007).
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abortion, it must be practicable for women within the state to avail them-
selves of it. As Irish law allowed for abortion where the life of a pregnant
woman was subject to a real and substantial risk, the lack of any guidance
for medics and women to determine whether abortion was lawfully permis-
sible in any given case was a violation of the Convention.192
The domestic reaction to A, B & C v. Ireland was strong. The Catho-
lic Church urged the State not to legislate in response to the decision, argu-
ing instead that a new referendum to narrow abortion availability ought to
be proposed to the People.193 Prominent intellectuals and commentators
who subscribe to a Catholic ethos spoke about how international human
rights law did not per se require the State to provide for abortion,194 arguing
that any demand for liberalization of abortion from international human
rights law was in conflict with the ethics and morals of the Irish position.195
The immediate reaction of the government was to establish an Expert Com-
mittee to consider how to respond to A, B & C196 and, ultimately, the
Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 was passed.
The passage of this Act was not without controversy. Debate about
whether or not to include a risk of death from suicide—an issue that re-
mained deeply controversial since X—was widespread, and the lack of a
time limit on life-saving abortion caused consternation in some quarters.197
One Cabinet Minister ultimately lost her position in government and the
party whip by refusing to vote in favor of the legislation.198 Amidst all of
this controversy, the Act itself was represented as the government’s response
to the Strasbourg Court’s judgment, rather than being a mechanism for
192. A, B & C, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 13 (2011).
193. See Submission by the Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference to Oireachtas Joint Committee
on Health and Children (Jan. 4, 2013), available at http://www.oireachtas.ie/parlia-
ment/media/committees/healthandchildren/Submission-by-the-Irish-Catholic-Bish-
ops-Conference.pdf.
194. See Binchy, supra note 188.
195. William Binchy, Op-Ed., UN Committee’s View on Abortion Contradicts Core Ethical
Value of Human Rights, THE IRISH TIMES (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.irishtimes
.com/news/politics/uncommittee-s-view-on-abortion-contradicts-core-ethical-value-
of-human-rights-1.1899802.
196. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND CHILDREN, REPORT OF THE EXPERT GROUP ON THE JUDG-
MENT IN A, B, AND C V. IRELAND (Nov. 2012).
197. Susan Daly, Lucinda Creighton Says Term Limit on Abortions “The Minimum We Can
Offer”, THEJOURNAL.IE (July 11, 2013, 6:39 PM), http://www.thejournal.ie/lu-
cinda-creighton-gestational-limit-abortion-debate-989196-Jul2013.
198. Harry McGee, Marie O’Halloran, Mary Carolan & Michael O’Regan, Creighton
Replaced as Da´il Passes New Abortion Law, THE IRISH TIMES (July 12, 2013, 11:20
AM), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/creighton-replaced-as-da´il-passes-
new-abortion-law-1.1460261. Regarding the debate on suicide, see de Londras,
supra note 33; regarding the debate on time-limits, see de Londras & Graham, supra
note 19.
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giving effect to the will of the people as contained in Article 40.3.3 and
interpreted by the Supreme Court.199 The narrative of external imposition
continued, even in the context of legislation that had been called for by Irish
courts for more than two decades,200 and the content of which was sharply
constrained by constitutionalized fetal rights and the Government’s inter-
pretation of the restrictions that Article 40.3.3 imposed.
That conservative interpretation and the limited and punitive nature
of the 2013 Act, outlined in Part I, reflects the fact that the constitutional-
ization of fetal rights in 1983 resulted in a dominating discourse surround-
ing abortion of women’s rights in contest with fetal rights.  The textual
“equality” of the right to life of the fetus and of the pregnant woman was
subverted by a jurisprudence in which the State, through the modality of
litigation and court order, was constructed as having a responsibility to pro-
tect and vindicate fetal rights. State power is used in support of this in order
to override women’s rights except in the narrowest of circumstances, and
whether or not a woman falls into these circumstances is now strictly regu-
lated by legislation. Under that Act—the Protection of Life During Preg-
nancy Act 2013—the decision as to whether a woman can have an abortion
rests entirely with medics;201 the views of pregnant women have little, if
anything, to do with it. The construction of abortion as a matter of rights,
and particularly of fetal rights, has been—and remains—strikingly success-
ful in Ireland.
Even if sufficient momentum can be raised for a constitutional
Amendment to be put to the People in a referendum, securing a proposed
wording that moves us away from fetal rights as the core animating concern
will be a significant challenge. If the Constitution is changed in a way that
continues to constitutionalize fetal rights, this runs the risks of perpetuating
jurisprudence and practice that cause considerable material harm to women
and violations of their rights. In addition, in such circumstances the space
for political and personal judgment about abortion, as both a general and an
individual matter, would remain severely curtailed.
As outlined above, the 8th Amendment and its aftermath have im-
posed significant burdens on women in Ireland. Although contraception is
widely available and the morning-after pill is generally available throughout
the country (albeit it at different price points and after a one-on-one consul-
tation with a pharmacist), women in Ireland do not have full reproductive
199. See Minister of Health James Reilly, Introduction of Protection of Life During Preg-
nancy Bill 2013, DA´IL DEBATES (Jun. 20, 2013), available at http://oireachtasde
bates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/takes/dail2013062000
009?opendocument).
200. See Soc’y for the Protection of the Unborn Child v. Grogan, [1989] I.R. 734, 770.
201. Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 (Act No. 35/2013).
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autonomy. The extremely limited availability of abortions, combined with
the burdens of travelling abroad to access abortion when it is desired, mean
that in practice as well as in law women are denied agency in respect of the
continuation of a pregnancy. This is true not only of women whose
pregnancies emanate from extremely repressive circumstances (such as rape
and incest), or where a medical condition means that the fetus will not be
born alive or survive for very long if born alive (i.e. cases of fatal fetal abnor-
mality), but for all women who experience pregnancy in Ireland.
Furthermore, the 8th Amendment fundamentally shapes the contours
and possibilities of medical decision-making beyond the context of abortion
per se. The newly developed concept of fetal best interests has potentially
wide-reaching effects for medical practice, which is already greatly affected
by the “two patient” approach that emanates from having to practice
medicine not only on a woman but also on a constitutionally-defined
rights-bearing fetus. Pregnant women in Ireland are deeply impacted by the
8th Amendment, whether they want to access an abortion or not (although
the inability to access abortion is at the heart of that impact). The fetocen-
tricity of obstetric medical practice in Ireland is deeply connected to the
presence of Article 40.3.3 in the Constitution. Women who are ill may not
receive required medical interventions because of a fear of impermissible
interference with fetal life. Women who are dead may be artificially sus-
tained in order to provide a “uterine environment” for fetal development.
Women who wish to have an abortion cannot get a referral from a clinician.
Article 40.3.3 is about far more than abortion. Its reach is wide. Its
impact is deep. And women exclusively feel its impact. That is the lived
experience that any reform of abortion law in Ireland must confront, and in
order to do so effectively the discourse of rights must be reoriented in the
context of abortion. That is the real impact of constitutionalizing fetal
rights.
VIII. CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN IRELAND
It is clear from the above analysis that no meaningful reform of Irish
abortion law is possible without constitutional change, but also that the
form of constitutional change itself is important. If the question of abortion
in Ireland is to be reshaped in a meaningful way, then a movement away
from a dominant discourse of fetal rights is necessary. That can only be
achieved by replacing constitutionalized fetal rights with a constitutional
recognition of women’s autonomy and by opening up political space for the
availability of abortion in Ireland to be determined on the basis of politics,
policy, and evidence.
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For some, the primary aim is the repeal of the 8th Amendment (often
advocated together with repeal of the provisions on travel and information),
without any replacement in the text of the Constitution itself. Such an ap-
proach, while attractive in its simplicity, seems insufficient to clearly and
unequivocally “deconstitutionalize” the matter of abortion.202 First, as out-
lined above, there is a pre-1983 jurisprudence on the right to life of the
unborn, which would not be clearly disrupted by the removal of Article
40.3.3. Rather, it is arguable that the unenumerated right to life of the
unborn could be resurrected in the event of a simple repeal without replace-
ment. Were that to be the case, then arguments about the need to restrict
travel and information—which could be made if the travel and information
provisions were also repealed—could be made in a manner that would con-
vince courts. Furthermore, the welfare/best interests of the fetus approach
advocated in PP v. HSE may well survive such a repeal, with its entire at-
tendant potential for shaping maternal care in Ireland.
It is true, and important to note, that this seems somewhat unlikely. If
a referendum to remove the 8th Amendment were approved by a majority
of voters, the Supreme Court would almost certainly see in that an inten-
tion to remove a constitutional protection for the right to life of the unborn.
However, predicting the circumstances in which this unenumerated right
might make an appearance in argumentation before the Court is extremely
challenging and, should it be successfully argued, the implications may well
be wide-ranging. It would therefore seem sensible to suggest that a “mere”
repeal may well be insufficient for the purposes of deconstitutionalizing the
issue of abortion in Ireland.
Furthermore, a simple repeal would not reorient the discourse of abor-
tion law and regulation in Ireland away from fetal rights. As argued above,
the fetocentrism of the discourse of abortion in Ireland is directly related to
the constitutionalization of fetal rights. It was through the legal codification
of a fetal right to life that the courts and politics have developed an ap-
proach to abortion in which protection of the fetus, rather than recognition
of women’s autonomy and the value of reproductive justice, has been the
primary concern. Thus, reorientation of the discourse away from fetal rights
is of fundamental importance. This cannot clearly be achieved through sim-
ple repeal, not only because an unenumerated right to life for the fetus may
remain within the constitutional acquis, but also because the Constitution
would remain devoid of an expression of the value of women’s autonomy,
independence, and control over reproduction. Thus, repeal and replacement
would appear to be more appropriate.
202. See Enright & de Londras, supra note 146.
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What form, then, might a constitutional Amendment that appropri-
ately considers women’s lived experiences, the need to shift away from a
fetal rights discourse, and a commitment to reproductive justice take? I ar-
gue that a replacement text that expressly endorses a reproductive justice
approach, and leaves room for political judgment and contestation is to be
preferred. Such a statement should be open, and include a provision recog-
nizing that “the availability of abortion shall not be unlawful.” An express
endorsement of a reproductive justice approach is desirable for the reasons
outlined above and would effectively shift the constitutional discourse away
from an almost-exclusive focus on fetal rights. Constitutional recognition of
women’s right to reproductive autonomy would create space in which the
political process can liberate itself from the pre-determination of questions
about abortion that Article 40.3.3 currently imposes. Furthermore, this ap-
proach would create an imperative for Irish politicians to finally use their
judgment to regulate the availability of abortion in Ireland. It may well be
that this judgment would result in a limited abortion law regime in Ireland,
but even if that were the case, it would be the product of a reasoned political
debate in which effective deliberation as to the regulation of abortion in
Ireland was engaged.
Although it is argued that Article 40.3.3 reflects “the will of the Peo-
ple,” its capacity to creep into all areas of maternal care was not foreseen. In
any case, the lived experience of women in Ireland stands in such sharp
contrast to the absoluteness of the 8th Amendment that there is a strong
democratic argument in favor of revisiting the matter. This is not least be-
cause the Irish people have never been presented with a proposed constitu-
tional change that would liberalize the legal regime in a meaningful way.
For that constitutional change to be meaningful it must deconstitutionalize
fetal rights, recognize women’s autonomy, commit the State to reproductive
justice, and leave the space for politics to determine the future of Irish abor-
tion law.
The difficult tale of abortion law and fetal rights jurisprudence in Ire-
land since 1983 demonstrates the risks that come with constitutionalizing
fetal rights. However, the greatest challenge has yet to be confronted: to
unshackle political imagination from the structure and language that consti-
tutionalized fetal rights have embedded in the Irish legal, political, and med-
ical cultures. The suffocation of such imagination may well transpire to be
the greatest hurdle to reform and, for the architects of the 8th Amendment,
their greatest achievement.

